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THE HANDY WAR BOOK

A New Book of Important and Authentic Information and Statistics
on the Many Subjects Related to the Present War, Such
as Size, Population, Climate, Commerce and Resources
of the Islands Concerned in the Spanish-American
Conflict, with Many Other Facts Which
Readers of War News Should Have.

Pictures of U. S. War Vessels

And a Classification and Description of the Various Ships in
Navies of Spain and America, with Definitions of
Naval Terms Used in Press Dispatches.

FINE WAR MAPS

Of Cuba, Porto Rico, Philippines, Havana and Harbor, and West
India Islands, and a Large Map of the World

By LIEUT. E. HANNAFORD

MAST, CROWELL & KIRKPATRICK, Publishers

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THE

HANDY WAR BOOK

Containing Authentic Information and Statistics on Subjects
Relating to the War, with Descriptions of the American
and Spanish Navies; also a Brief History of Cuba,
Porto Rico, the Philippines and Other Islands.

WITH ACCURATE WAR MAPS AND
PHOTOGRAPHIC PICTURES OF
U. S. WAR VESSELS.

BY LIEUT. E. HANNAFORD

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
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


Protected Steel Cruiser—Admiral Dewey's Flag-ship.

Length, 340 feet; breadth, 53 feet. Guns, four 8-inch, ten 5-inch rapid-fire, fourteen 6-pounder and six 1-pounder rapid-fire, and four Gatlings. Five torpedo tubes. Armor, in inches, deck 2, slope 4 $\frac{1}{2}$. Officers, 20; men, 293. Cost, \$1,796,000.

OLYMPIA.


Displacement, 5,870 Tons. Speed, 21 $\frac{1}{2}$ Knots.



Armored Cruiser—Admiral Sampson's Flag-ship.
Length, 380½ feet; breadth, 64¾ feet. Guns, six 8-inch breech-loading rifles, twelve 4-inch rapid-fire, and four
Gatlings. Four torpedo Tubes. Armor, in inches, sides 4, turrets 5½, barbettes 10, deck 3, slope 6.

NEW YORK.

Displacement, 8,200 Tons. Speed, 21 Knots.
Guns, six 8-inch breech-loading rapid-fire, and four
Contract price, \$2,985,000.




Battleship of the First Class.

Length, 348 feet; breadth, 69½ feet. Guns, four 13-inch, eight 8-inch and four 6-inch, four 1-pounder and twenty 6-pounder rapid-fire, and four Gatlings. Three torpedo tubes. Armor, in inches, sides 18, turrets 15, barbettes 8 to 17, deck 2½. Officers, 37; men, 438. Cost, \$3,020,000.

MASSACHUSETTS.

Displacement, 10,288 Tons. Speed, 15 Knots.



Armored Cruiser—Commodore Schley's Flag-ship.

Length, 400 feet; breadth, 64 feet. Guns, eight 8-inch breech-loading rifles, twelve 5-inch rapid-fire, twelve 6-pounder and four 1-pounder rapid-fire, and four Gatlings. Four torpedo tubes. Armor, in inches, sides 3, turrets $5\frac{1}{2}$, barbettes 8, deck 3, slope 6. Officers, 46; men, 515. Cost, \$2,986,000.

BROOKLYN.

Displacement, 9,271 Tons. Speed, 20 Knots.



Second-class Battleship.

MAINE.

Speed, $17\frac{1}{2}$ knots.

(Blown up in Havana Harbor, February 15, 1898.)

Length, 318 feet; breadth, 57 feet. Displacement, 6,682 tons. Guns, four 10-inch and six 6-inch breech-loading rifles, seven 6-pounder and eight 1-pounder rapid-fire, and four Gatlings. Four torpedo-tubes. Armor, in inches, sides 12, turrets 8, barbettes 12, deck 2. Officers, 34; men, 370. Contract price, \$2,500,000.




Protected Steel Cruiser.

COLUMBIA.

Speed, 23 knots.

Length, 412 feet; breadth, $58\frac{1}{4}$ feet. Displacement, 7,375 tons. Guns, one 8-inch breech-loading rifle, two 6-inch and eight 4-inch rapid-fire, twelve 6-pounder and four 1-pounder rapid-fire, and four Gatlings. Four torpedo-tubes. Armor, in inches, deck $2\frac{1}{2}$, slope 7. Officers, 35; men, 429. Cost, \$2,725,000.



Protected Steel Cruiser.

PHILADELPHIA.

Speed, $19\frac{1}{2}$ knots.

Length, $327\frac{1}{2}$ feet; breadth, $48\frac{1}{2}$ feet. Displacement, 4,324 tons. Guns, twelve 6-inch breech-loading rifles, four 6-pounder, four 3-pounder and two 1-pounder rapid-fire, three 37-millimeter Hotchkiss revolving cannon, and four Gatlings. Four torpedo-tubes. Armor, in inches, deck $2\frac{1}{2}$, slope 4. Officers, 34; men 350. Cost, \$1,350,000.




Protected Steel Cruiser.

NEWARK.

Speed, 19 knots.

Length, 310 feet; breadth, 49 feet. Displacement, 4,098 tons. Guns, twelve 6-inch breech-loading rifles, four 6-pounder, four 3-pounder and two 1-pounder rapid-fire, four 37-millimeter Hotchkiss revolving cannon, and four Gatlings. Six torpedo-tubes. Armor, in inches, deck 2, slope 3. Officers, 34; men, 350. Cost, \$1,248,000.



Protected Steel Cruiser

CHARLESTON.

Speed, 18 knots.

Length, 312½ feet, breadth, 46 feet. Displacement, 3,730 tons. Guns, two 8-inch and six 6-inch breech-loading rifles, four 6-pounder, two 3-pounder and two 1-pounder rapid-fire, four 37-millimeter Hotchkiss revolving cannon, and two Gatlings. Four torpedo-tubes. Armor, in inches, deck 2, slope 3. Officers, 20; men, 280. Cost, \$1,017,500.



Protected Steel Cruiser.

CHICAGO.

Speed, 15 knots.

Length, 325 feet; breadth, 48 feet. Displacement, 4,500 tons. Guns, four 8-inch, eight 6-inch and two 5-inch breech-loading rifles, nine 6-pounder and four 1-pounder rapid-fire, two 37-millimeter Hotchkiss revolving cannon, and two Gatlings. Armor, in inches, deck and slope 1½. Officers, 33; men, 376. Cost, \$889,000.




Double-turret Monitor.

AMPHITRITE.

Speed, 12 knots.

Length, 259½ feet; breadth, 55½ feet. Displacement, 3,990 tons. Guns, four 10-inch breech-loading rifles, two 6-pounder and two 3-pounder rapid-fire, two 37-millimeter Hotchkiss revolving cannon, two 1-pounder rapid-fire cannon. Armor, in inches, sides 9, turrets 7½, barbettes 11½, deck 1½. Officers, 13; men, 136. Cost, \$3,178,046.




Double-turret Monitor.

PURITAN.

Speed, 12½ knots.

Length, 289½ feet; breadth, 60 feet. Displacement, 6,060 tons. Guns, four 10-inch breech-loading rifles, and eight rapid-fire and machine-guns. Armor, in inches, sides 14, turrets 8, barbettes 14, deck 2. Officers, 22; men, 208. Cost, \$3,178,046.



Double-turret Monitor.

MIANTONOMOH.

Speed, $10\frac{1}{2}$ knots.

Length, $259\frac{1}{2}$ feet; breadth, $55\frac{3}{4}$ feet. Displacement, 3,990 tons. Guns, four 10-inch breech-loading rifles, two 6-pounder, two 3-pounder and two 1-pounder rapid-fire. Armor, in inches, sides 7, turrets $11\frac{1}{2}$, deck $1\frac{3}{4}$. Officers, 13; men, 136. Has a double bottom, 28 inches clear space between the two. Cost, \$3,178,046.




Armored Ram.

KATAHDIN.

Speed, 17 knots.

Length, 250 $\frac{3}{4}$ feet; breadth, $43\frac{1}{2}$ feet. Displacement, 2,155 tons. Guns, four 6-pounder rapid-fire. Armor, in inches, sides 6 at top and 3 at bottom. Officers, 7; men, 91. Cost, \$930,000. The only war-vessel of its kind in the world.

Cuba and Spanish-American War.

OLLOWING up the discovery which was to immortalize his name, and the date October 12, 1492, Columbus cruised westward among the West Indian isles, and on October 28th entered the mouth of a river in the "great land" of which he had heard many times before reaching it. This land, indescribably beautiful and fertile, the natives called Cuba. Mistaken as the great discoverer was in fondly believing he had here touched the shores of the great gold-bearing continent he was seeking, the "Gem of the Antilles" is far the most important island of the West Indies—almost incomparably so if Hayti be left out of the account. A climate so delightful as to seem a perpetual summer, a soil inexhaustibly rich, tropical luxuriance of growth in field and forest, varied loveliness of natural scenery, no less than twenty-seven good harbors—these combine to make Cuba one of nature's most favored regions; while its commanding position at the entrance of the Gulf of Mexico might well stimulate the acquisitive ambition of nations. "It is so near to us," said President Cleveland's message of December, 1896, "as to be hardly separated from our own territory." The Strait of Florida can be crossed by steamer in five hours.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF CUBA.

DIMENSIONS. Cuba is about 760 miles in length; in width it varies from 127 miles on a line passing some fifty miles west of Santiago, to not exceeding 28 miles from Havana southward. Its area is about 42,000 square miles, exclusive of the Isle of Pines and other small islands, the former containing 1,200, the latter aggregating 970 square miles. Thus, in dimensions, Cuba closely approximates the state of New York. Compared with Long Island, it is twenty-eight times larger.

MOUNTAINS. Cuba is traversed lengthwise by a mountainous range, which is highest in the eastern part, where it is broken up into spurs, or transverse ridges. The most elevated summit is 7,670 feet above sea-level, but the average height of the mountains does not exceed 2,200 feet. The rivers are necessarily short, flowing some north, some south, from the central watershed.

FORESTS**AND SWAMPS.**

Scarcely more than one third of the land has yet been brought under cultivation. One half the island is covered with primeval forests. The lowlands of the coast are inundated in the wet season, or at least turned into impassable swamps of black and wonderfully tenacious mud. Add to this feature the immense reaches of trackless forest, filled everywhere with an almost impenetrable growth of underbrush, not to mention that the dry plains are to a large extent a jungle of very high bushes and thick grasses (*manigua*), and one may begin to form some idea of the difficulties that are inseparable from a campaign in this land of tropical suns and lurking fevers.

STRATEGIC CONDITIONS**OF THE WAR.**

The two conditions above described largely account for the surprising paucity of results accomplished for so long a period in the war of 1895-1898 by the vastly preponderant armies of Spain. The insurgent forces, being so inferior numerically, were obliged to remain amid the favoring shelter of the mountains and other inaccessible timbered regions. The necessity of cutting paths through the dense undergrowth of the forests and among the jungled *manigua* of the dry plains accounts for the omnipresence of the machete in the Cuban's warfare. This famous weapon is primarily not a weapon at all, but an implement designed for hewing a passage through the limitless woody expanses above mentioned. Surprising strength and skill are acquired in wielding this favorite and usually horn-handled blade of from twenty-four to thirty inches in length, perfectly straight, as heavy as a cleaver, with an edge always kept like a razor. It somewhat resembles an American farmer's corn-scythe, only it is made for heavier work, and the cutting is done with the outer edge instead of the inner one.

CLIMATE.

The climate of the low coast-lands is tropical; that of the more elevated interior resembles the warmer portions of the temperate zone. As regards temperature, it is remarkably equable, making Havana a sanatorium of world-wide celebrity for sufferers from bronchial and pulmonary troubles. The mean annual temperature there is 77 to 80 degrees. Eighty-two degrees is the average for July and August, and 72 for December and January, the total range of the thermometer during the year being only 30 degrees, or from 58 to 88. The average annual rainfall at Havana is 40.5 inches, of which 27.8 inches is during the wet season (from the middle of April to the middle of October). Fireplaces are unknown in Cuba's capital, and almost so are glazed windows, which are replaced by double sets of shutters or curtains.

YELLOW FEVER.

Yellow fever seldom becomes epidemic in the elevated interior, notwithstanding its prevalence during the summer in Havana and other seaports, whose wretched sanitation constantly invites the attacks of this dreaded scourge. Consul-

General (now Major-General) Fitzhugh Lee, when before the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, April 12, 1898, gave it as his opinion that no serious danger from yellow fever need be apprehended in conducting a summer campaign in Cuba with troops from the United States.

CUBAN RESOURCES AND INDUSTRIES.

PRODUCTS. Cuban sugars and tobaccos are famous the world over. In this work separate sections are given them, as also another one to coffee. Next in export value come oranges and the various native woods, including a superior quality of mahogany. The cigar-boxes so familiarly known throughout the United States and Europe are made from a tree of the same natural order as mahogany, but popularly known as cedar, a wood which is also much used for the inside of drawers, wardrobes, etc. The official value of the total exports for one year shortly before the beginning of the last insurrection was upward of \$83,000,000, consisting almost wholly of agricultural products and fruits.

PALMS AND FRUITS. The several different species of palms found in Cuba are luxuriant specimens of tropical trees. The Royal palm, rising to the height of one hundred feet or more, is strikingly beautiful and majestic. The cocoanut-palm grows wild, a glorious tree, immensely rich in leaves and fruit. In some seasons oranges have been so abundant that on the great estates, as a traveler declares, they "lay all about on the bright red earth, little naked negroes kicking aside and satiated pigs disdainfully neglecting great luscious fruit which the North would have piled with great pride upon salvers of silver and porcelain." The banana "bunches" are always cut from the parent stem while green.

SUGAR. The ingenios, or sugar-plantations, with large buildings and mills for sugar-refining, have always been the most important industrial establishments of the island. Though his former lordliness and feudal magnificence underwent, of late years, more or less modification, the great sugar-planter was still a prince of agriculture up to 1895. He had an immense advantage over all his foreign competitors in the fertility of his soil, which seemed practically exhaustless. Not all the bounty-stimulated and cheaper production of beet-sugar in Europe has been able to displace Cuban sugars in foreign markets, though competition from this source has largely reduced the profits in raising them. The introduction of modern machinery requiring large capital has more than counteracted that natural tendency to subdivide great holdings of land which is usually observed when a system of slave labor gives place to a free one, and has aided in crowding the smaller planters to the wall.

In Cuba the grinding season lasts twice as long as it does in Louisiana. The sugar was put up in jute bags (the government tax on which trebled their cost to the planter), averaging something over three hundred pounds each, and in this shape was sent to Havana or other port. Under conditions of peace the sugar production approximates one million tons per annum. Well-informed Americans consider this only one fifth the amount which, with a good government and proper enterprise, the island is capable of yielding. The average value of sugar exported amounts to \$50,000,000, and of molasses \$9,000,000, of which eighty per cent goes to the United States.

TOBACCO. Tobacco as a source of income ranks next after sugar. Yet the tobacco industry under Spanish rule was always an uncertain one, owing to the restrictions and exactions imposed by the government, which controlled it as a monopoly in the interests of the crown and the Spanish officials. The salaries of the officers of the government *Factoria de Tobacco* in Havana were quoted as high as \$541,000 for a single year. Cuba's tobacco crop in 1895 was estimated at about \$10,000,000.

For tobacco-raising the rich plains in the western province of Cuba, Pinar del Rio, have no rival in the world. This is the region which Maceo, commanding the insurgent "Army of Invasion," chose as the principal theater of his operations in the campaign of 1896, and where, in consequence, the tobacco crop of that year was nearly all lost. Riding through the fields just at the critical season for cutting and curing the leaves, his troops enlisted thousands of the laborers and stampeded the rest. The Spaniards, regarding the rebellion and the tobacco interests as largely identical—perhaps not without reason, either—retaliated with ruinous effect wherever their army could reach.

COFFEE. This crop formerly came next to sugar in export value, as also in profit to the planters; and although Brazil long since broke down, without entirely destroying, the Cuban coffee trade, the *cafetals*, as the coffee estates are called, are still scattered throughout the island, especially as adjuncts to the great *ingenios*, where their ornamental effects are much prized. Coffee culture was introduced from Hayti in 1748, and fifty years later received a great impetus from the superior methods introduced by intelligent and wealthy French planters escaped from the now proverbial "horrors of San Domingo."

MINERALS. Cuba's mineral resources remain but slightly developed. The mountains, wooded to the summit, in places contain iron and copper, both of which, as also manganese, are exported. Though silver ore has been found, and in some of the rivers alluvial gold deposits, Cuba as a producer of the precious metals has always ranked low. Bituminous coal deposits in extensive layers seem to constitute the most important item of its mineral wealth, and in a few years will doubtless be mined in large quantities.

CUBAN PEOPLE, CAPITAL, ETC.

POPULATION. The latest census of Cuba is that which was taken in 1887, as follows:

PROVINCES.	WHITE.	COLORED.	TOTAL.
Havana.....	344,417	107,511	451,928
Pinar del Rio.....	167,160	58,731	225,891
Matanzas.....	143,169	116,401	259,570
Santa Clara.....	244,345	109,777	354,122
Puerto Principe.....	54,232	13,557	67,789
Santiago de Cuba.....	157,980	114,339	272,319
Total.....	1,111,303	520,316	1,631,619

As regards density, this population was distributed very unevenly in the several provinces, being per square kilometer (a kilometer is within a fraction of five eighths of an English mile) as follows: Santiago de Cuba, 7.75; Puerto Principe, 2.10; Santa Clara, 15.34; Matanzas, 30.59; Havana, 52.49; Pinar del Rio, 15.09. The population of the state of New York, a little larger than Cuba, in 1890 was 5,997,853.

RELIGION AND EDUCATION.

The Spanish government recognized but one religion—the Roman Catholic. Education has been greatly neglected, anything in the nature of public schools for the benefit of the people in general being entirely unknown. One of the grievances of the Cuban patriots for generations lay along this line. The present government has incorporated religious toleration and the diffusion of education in the Constitution as corner-stones of the Republic, thus distinctly patterning after the United States.

CITY OF HAVANA.

The famous capital of Cuba, which is also the commercial center of the West Indies, was founded in 1519. Its harbor is very fine. It is the foremost tobacco and sugar market of the world, and manufactures cigars in immense quantities. The census of 1887 showed a population of 200,448. The city, which is made up of the "old" and "new" towns, the latter outside the old walls, has handsome suburbs, besides many and beautiful public parks and promenades.

Havana is a metropolis of wealth, good living and general luxury, with an abundance of cafes and restaurants, fairly rivaling those of Paris. It is massively built, mostly of stone, and paved with granite or other stone equally hard, as being the best material for this land of prodigious rains and flaming suns. Murat Halstead, the veteran American journalist, designates it a city of palaces fronting on alleys, some of the principal thoroughfares, sidewalks and all, having a width of only twenty-five feet, and none of the streets being kept clean. The

cathedral of Havana, venerable and imposing without, ornate and brilliant within, has in its keeping (unless an almost incredible fraud was perpetrated in 1796) the priceless treasure of the bones of Columbus, in a marble urn. Morro Castle, at the entrance of the harbor, is quite celebrated, lastly as the dreary prison of political offenders, including more than one American. For harbor defense, however, the main reliance is some newer fortifications on the neighboring hills, a little way back from the sea-front.

Santiago de Cuba comes next to Havana in population. **OTHER CITIES.** It contained 71,307 in 1892, while Matanzas had 56,379, Puerto Principe 46,641 and Cienfuegos 40,964. (An enumeration was made in the cities in 1892, but not over the whole island.)

COMMUNICATIONS. Before the war there were about 1,000 miles of railroad in regular operation throughout the island, besides 200 miles of private lines running to the large sugar-plantations. The telegraph lines aggregated 2,810 miles. The number of vessels that entered the five principal ports—Havana, Santiago, Cienfuegos, Trinidad and Nuevitas—in 1894 was in round numbers two thousand, with a tonnage of two and one half millions.

CUBA UNDER SPAIN.

EARLY SPANISH RULE. Forty years of cruel and rigorous servitude sufficed to blot the three hundred thousand gentle, indolent aborigines of Cuba off the face of the earth. For a long time the island continued sparsely settled, its wondrous agricultural capabilities surprisingly unappreciated. The Spanish vessels passing between the New World and the home ports of Cadiz and Barcelona invariably made the harbor of Havana; that city quickly grew into importance, but the rest of the island lay neglected. Meanwhile the West Indian waters were churned into bloody foam whenever war arose in Europe. Here would assemble the French, the English, the Dutch navies, and here they dealt some of their most telling blows upon the power of Spain at sea. Havana was destroyed by a French privateer in 1538, and again in 1554, and in 1624 the Dutch captured it, but gave it back to Spain. During two centuries the rich Spanish galleons (a treasure-ship and merchantman) offered an irresistible temptation to hostile seamen and swarming buccaneers.

ENGLISH CONQUEST
OF 1762. The conquest of Havana and other important points in Cuba by the English in 1792 was a striking feat of arms, which, strange as it sounds, owed its success to a timely reinforcement of 2,300 men, under General Lyman and Lieutenant-Colonel Israel Putnam, from the colonies of Connecticut, New York and New Jersey. The resistance of the Spaniards cost the victors dearly, most of all in an appalling death-

rate from disease, exposure and lack of water. The spoil taken was enormous, that part of it which was divided among the British soldiers and sailors as prize-money amounting to about \$4,000,000. Lord Albemarle and Sir George Pocock each pocketed about \$600,000. English statecraft never made a worse bargain than when it gave Cuba back to Spain in 1763, in exchange for a barren title to Florida. Had England held Cuba, French assistance in the American Revolution might have been futile, and possibly George III. would have had his way, instead of Washington and Hancock having theirs.

FROM 1763 TO 1848. The replacement of the iron and bloody hand of Spain retarded, but did not check, the development of Cuba's marvelous resources. When the French deposed the reigning family in Spain, in 1808, Cuba declared war against Napoleon. Nor was this sentiment of loyalty subverted by the example of successful revolt on all sides. Spain lost Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Chili, etc., but Cuba remained her prize, with only one disturbance of note, the Black Eagle Conspiracy of 1829, amid it all. However, because of government (since 1810) by a foreign captain-general, also because of the heavy taxation, a discontent was breeding, which gradually hardened into opposition, hatred and defiance after 1836, when Cuba was denied a share in the benefits of the new constitution granted the mother-country. The antagonisms of race likewise came into play, and 1844 brought the short-lived insurrection of the blacks.

AMERICAN OVERTURES. In 1848 President Polk offered Spain \$1,000,000 for the island, but encountered an indignant refusal. In 1851 Narcisso Lopez, a Venezuelan and a filibuster, led a much-vaunted expedition from one of our southern ports into its death-trap in the western part of Cuba, and was garroted. The famous Ostend Manifesto by the United States ministers to England, France and Spain was issued in 1854, declaring that if Spain would not sell, this country should seize Cuba by force and annex it. The three movements last mentioned were conceived in the interest of slavery extension. In 1873 occurred the tragic Virginius incident, when Captain Fry, of that ill-fated vessel, and fifty-two other American prisoners were shot at Santiago as "pirates." In 1889 Sagasta, the Spanish premier, told the United States minister, Thomas W. Palmer, there was not gold enough in the world to purchase the island of Cuba.

WAR OF 1868-1878. The year 1868 inaugurated a determined effort for Cuban independence, in which the military leadership of Maximo Gomez, a retired officer and native West Indian, was conspicuous. The war dragged its weary length for ten years, its operations being limited to the eastern third of the island. It was finally terminated by the treaty of El Zanjón, between Cespedes, the civil head of the revolutionary movement (Gomez and most of the generals assenting), and Captain-General Martinez Campos. This treaty

was hailed with delight by all; by the Cubans as also a guarantee of autonomy, and of personal rights and privileges, and equal protection under the law. Gomez then retired to his family and little farm in Santo Domingo. The "ten years of ruin and of tears" for Cuba had cost Spain \$60,000,000 and 100,000 men, most of them by yellow fever. Of course, the expenses of the war were saddled on Cuba.

CAUSES OF CUBAN DISCONTENT.

A HOLLOW MOCKERY.

The Cuban patriots always claimed that the treaty of El Zanjón (see preceding paragraph) became a hollow mockery in the hands of its Spanish administrators. Names only were changed, not methods. The title of captain-general gave place to governor-general, but it was the same office, the same arbitrary, irresponsible power, as before. The right of banishment was nominally given up, but a "law of vagrancy" was framed, which accomplished precisely the same end. The brutal attacks on defenseless citizens were prohibited, but under a new and soft Castilian name they still went on, and remained unpunished. Taxation without the knowledge or consent of the Cubans themselves was, as ever, the core of the whole fiscal system. The groundwork of the administrative policy remained the same; namely, to exclude every native Cuban from every office which could in any way give him effective influence in public affairs, and to make the most out of the labor of the colonists for the benefit of the mother-country.

INJUSTICE AND OPPRESSION.

The Spaniards never conceived any other policy than that the helpless Cubans were in duty bound to maintain the manufactures of Spain, and be doubly taxed—once as goods went, and again as goods came—for the privilege of the exchange. The government at Madrid was always on the alert to issue decrees whose effect would be to cheapen sugar and tobacco, the two great Cuban products, and at the same time to compel the importation by Cuba of many things which she ought to raise in her own fields or fabricate in her own shops, the only consideration being how to raise the largest revenue possible, by an export duty on the former and a tariff duty on the latter. The oppression this policy wrought was greatly aggravated by the all-pervading corruption in the custom-houses. Spain practically confiscated the product of the Cubans' labor without giving them in return either safety or prosperity, nor yet education. She systematically impoverished Cuba, and demoralized its people by condemning them to political inferiority.

TAXATION AND DEBT.

The Cuban deputies were never able to accomplish anything in the Cortes at Madrid; in fact, few of them really attempted anything, the majority owing their places to distinctly Spanish influence. The vast sums amassed by taxes mul-

titudinous, searching, grasping, were raised and spent, not for roads, not for schools, not for improvements, not for developing internal resources, but for the enrichment and indulgence of a swarm of overbearing foreigners. Spain had fastened on Cuba a debt of \$200,000,000, considerably over \$100 per capita, and in addition a system of taxation which wrung \$39,000,000 annually from the Cubans.

THE SPANISH SIDE. On the other hand, the Spanish officials protested that the political regime had been entirely transformed on the lines of the treaty of El Zanjón. The island was immediately divided into its present six provinces. The last vestige of slavery was removed in 1886, two years before the limit set. (Concerning this, the Cubans insist that the ten years' war had killed slavery anyhow, and the royal decrees were simply its obituary.) The promised constitutional reforms, according to this view, were carried out in good faith, including, besides Cuban representation in the Cortes, a considerable extension of the suffrage and of the principle of self-government, the promotion of education, the legalizing of civil marriages, etc. Cuba, in short, was a spoiled child. The revolutionary leaders were pestiferous cranks and adventurers, the Maceos—who were mulattoes—being particularly obnoxious, as inciters of revolt among the blacks.

CUBAN REVOLUTION BEGUN.

THE CUBAN JUNTA. The Cuban exiles at Key West and other Florida points, as also New York City, with those in the non-Spanish West Indies, Mexico, Honduras and Venezuela, numbered many thousands, including numerous veterans of the ten years' war; and these lived in perpetual ferment over some project or other for the liberation of Cuba, always keeping in close touch with their compatriots there. A supreme Revolutionary Junta was formed, with New York City for headquarters, and for its master-spirit that indomitable and tireless organizer, Jose Martí. Before the end of 1894 the Junta had the moral and material support of nearly one hundred and fifty revolutionary clubs, all actively at work in raising a war fund and purchasing arms and ammunition. The Cuban cigar-makers, etc., in the United States pledged to the cause one tenth of their earnings, or more if needed. Calleja was now governor-general of Cuba, a liberal-minded man for a Spaniard, but hampered continually from Madrid.

RIPENING REVOLT. Meantime the malcontents at home were steadily adding to the limited supply of arms that had been secreted there since the war closed in 1878, doing so mostly by smuggling them in, or by purchase from corrupt underlings at the government arsenals. A "filibustering expedition" was broken up by the United States authorities, January 14, 1895, at Fernandina, Florida,

when on the eve of sailing. One of its leaders was Antonio Maceo. Three others of them, Jose Martí, Collego and Rodríguez, were next heard of in February, in Santo Domingo, whither they had gone to concert further measures with their fellow-partisans living in Cuba. It was at this period that Martí, president of the Revolutionary Junta, made his way to a modest home in the western part of Santo Domingo, and to the same able and wily soldier, veteran of a dozen wars, who had been prominent in the last Cuban army, officially tendered the organization and the command of the Cuban army of the future. And Máximo Gómez accepted.

DESULTORY OUTBREAKS.

The program agreed on contemplated a rising in all six provinces on February 24, 1895. This is the Cuban's Fourth of July, the date of the revolutionists' formal declaration of war, though, as it turned out, they were then able to raise the flag of the republic in but three provinces, only one of which seemed the theater of events at all threatening; for the disturbances reported in Matanzas and Santa Clara were soon quelled.

The province of Santiago de Cuba is for the most part thinly settled, which, with its generally mountainous and densely wooded character, makes it an ideal territory for guerrilla warfare. The uprising there, February 24th, aroused the Spanish authorities to a sense of annoyance—scarcely more. But the handful of insurgent guerrillas playing hide-and-seek in the mountains and the swamps found welcome, succor, reinforcements, wherever they appeared. Then came the unearthing of a widespread plot in this same province that occasioned genuine alarm, the conspirators' plans including wholesale conflagrations, and the extermination of the Spanish officials and soldiery, beginning with the resident governor.

CALLEJA'S DIFFICULTIES.

Calleja proclaimed martial law in Santiago, also in Matanzas, and hurried detachments to both. Out of a nominal army of 20,000 he could put only 9,000 effectives into the field, while of thirteen gunboats on patrol duty along the coast no more than seven were fit for service. The commissary arrangements were so bad as to more than once block important movements of the troops. The almost daily story of the telegraph would be the appearance in such or such a district of an insurrectionary band, which at the approach of troops vanished into the mountains or the swamps—where pursuit was impossible—reappearing in a few days as raiders on such and such loyalists' plantations, which they not only plundered, but enticed the laborers away from, thus terrorizing the community and ruining the prospects for a crop.

THREE PARTIES.

Of the three parties in Cuba—Loyalists, Separatists and Autonomists—the first comprised those of Spanish birth or Spanish patronage—the office-holding class, and all others whose privileges and interests were bound up with a continuance of the

existing regime. The Separatists were the party of revolution, of Cuba libre, ready to fight for independence as the only remedy for their country's ills. The Cubans in the United States, as well as the thousands of other exiles in the lands and islands neighboring Cuba, belonged to this party almost to a man, and so, by racial instinct, did the negro population. The Autonomists occupied middle ground, passionately inveighing against the misgovernment, favoritism and centralization which disgraced the state of things around them, yet limiting their demands to home rule under Spain, such as Canada enjoys under England.

CAMPAIGN OF 1895.

MACEO IN CUBA.

It was the first of April when Antonio Maceo, with twenty-two comrades of the former war, who had sailed from Costa Rica, landed near Baracoa, on almost the eastern tip of Cuba. Intercepted by a mounted Spanish party, they kept up a brave though shifting fight for many hours, and after several of his companions had fallen and his hat been shot through, Maceo managed to elude his pursuers and get away. For ten days he continued his stealthy progress westward through the woods, living on the plantains and other tropical fruits that grow wild in Cuba. At length, in the rough country north of Bahia de Guantnamo, he stumbled upon a body of rebels, and identifying himself, was welcomed with rapturous enthusiasm. His was indeed a name to conjure with, because of his famous deeds in the last war and his unquenchable devotion to Cuba libre. At once he took command of the insurgent bands in the vicinity, and began recruiting vigorously. In three sharp brushes that he presently had with small Spanish detachments he more than held his own, the moral effect of which was especially valuable. Since 1878 the mulatto chieftain had become a traveler and for all practical purposes an educated man. The art of war he had made a close study, out of books and in every other way he could find. That he served at one time in capacity of hostler at West Point is a myth. His only surviving brother, Jose, who had come over from Costa Rica with him, was also given a generalship, and fell during the war, a number of months before Maceo was so treacherously betrayed and slain.

ARRIVAL OF GOMEZ.

On the eleventh of April Maximo Gomez and Jose Marti together succeeded in crossing over from Santo Domingo, and landing on the southern coast. The district was alive with the enemy's patrols and pickets, so that for two days they were in constant danger; but ere the third evening they were safe within a rebel camp, and Gomez had entered upon his duties as commander-in-chief. Experienced leadership, their great lack at first, the rebels now had. Soon they numbered over six thousand men.

DEATH OF MARTI.

Marti and Gomez, having marched toward the central provinces, intent on arranging for a Constituent Assembly, as well as organizing insurrection, the former, on May 19th, was led into an ambush by a treacherous guide, and killed. Marti was the father, and thus far had been the soul, of the revolution. His body, after being embalmed, was borne to the city of Santiago, where it was buried by the Spanish commandant. It is said that he and his associates of the Junta had raised a million dollars for the promotion of the cause of the revolutionists.

**GOVERNOR-GENERAL
CAMPOS**

The few battalions of recruits who had hurried from Spain at the first call of Calleja (who had likewise got 7,000 troops from the other Spanish island of Porto Rico) were followed, in April, by no less than 25,000 men. On the sixteenth of that month Field-Marshal Campos, to the joy of the Spaniards, reached the port of Santiago de Cuba, on his way to Havana, relieving Calleja as governor-general. He took hold with energy. But his task grew daily, the contagion of revolt continuing to spread westward, and, in spite of very inadequate supplies of arms and ammunition, to gather military strength. Calleja had weeks before proclaimed the whole island under martial law. By May the Havana officials conceded they were coping not with mere brigandage, but with revolution. Sharp fighting at outlying points, though never between large numbers—heavy skirmishing—had now grown common. No longer were the Spaniards trying to ferret out a despised enemy in his hiding-places; for the rainy season, with its added discomforts and increased peril to life, was now on, and at best that kind of work was wearing and fruitless. All through the war the insurgents, secure in the good-will of the masses, enjoyed the great advantage of being kept fully informed of every move the government troops made; so now the rebels always contrived to give the Spaniards the slip, or on occasions to attack their columns from ambush.

**TACTICS OF THE
CAMPAIGN.**

The aim of Campos was to divide the island into zones by a series of strongly guarded military lines running north and south, and to move his successively consolidated forces toward the sunrise, and finally crowd the Cubans off the eastern end of the island. As it turned out, however, it was Gomez and Maceo who fiddled and Campos who danced. The governor-general had to keep shifting his drooping and water-soaked regiments from point to point, to meet threatened attacks or to protect this district or that from ruinous rebel incursions, and could not solidify even the two trochas he did begin.

Gomez adapted means to ends. Pitched battles and regular sieges were, with his limited resources, out of the question. The armies of oppression could not be crushed, but they might be harassed and their convoys cut off, might be worn out in a life of alarms and hard work,

might be picked off in detail—and yellow fever would do the rest. His hardened native soldiers, especially the negroes, would thrive and keep in fighting trim under hardships and exposure no European soldier could possibly undergo and live.

CAMPOS OUTMATCHED.

By the fourth week of May the rebel armies numbered over 10,000 men, of whom nearly three fourths were armed with good rifles. The Spanish war expenses in three months had been \$10,000,000, and their death-roll 190 officers and 4,846 men. Early in June Gomez put his plans into execution for the invasion of Puerto Principe, and brushing aside the attenuated opposition in his way, was soon in the heart of his old campaigning-ground in the 70's, with thousands flocking to his standard. Three weeks later Maceo, still in Santiago province, concentrated his forces in the Holguin district, moved southwestward, and demonstrated heavily against Bayamo, capturing train-load after train-load of provisions that were started for that place.

BATTLE OF BAYAMO.

Campos put himself at the head of 1,500 men, with General Santocildes next in command, and marched to the relief of the starving garrison. July 13th, several miles before reaching Bayamo, he was attacked by 2,700 rebels led by Maceo, and with his entire staff narrowly escaped capture. Only the heroism of Santocildes averted this catastrophe, at the cost of his own life. For hours the Spaniards, with admirable steadiness, fought their assailants on four sides, being surrounded, but finally broke through, and made good their escape to Bayamo, the rear-guard with difficulty covering their retreat. They had been saved by Maceo's lack of artillery. The Spanish loss in killed was seven officers and 119 men; that of the Cubans was nearly as great. But Maceo, by a rapid flank movement and a tremendous assault upon the enemy's rear, had captured the ammunition train—a prize indeed. Campos did not dare to stir from Bayamo for several days, or until strong reinforcements had reached him. By this time Maceo had brought about the concentration of 10,000 of the enemy. He then withdrew.

SPANISH LOSSES.

By early August the Spanish losses by death had reached 20,000 men; by September 1st their expenditures to \$21,300,000. The Madrid government, after already realizing \$48,000,000 from the sale, at 40 per cent, of \$120,000,000 worth of Cuban bonds of the series of 1890, in October negotiated a \$14,000,000 loan with some Paris and Dutch bankers.

AUTUMN CAMPAIGN.

Campos had massed his troops at commanding points on the railroads and along the trochas, while the commercial seaports, besides being strongly garrisoned, were under the sheltering guns of the Spanish war-ships. The heavy reinforcements dispatched from Spain in August, unlike the earlier ones, were mainly veterans, the flower of the Spanish army.

September found not only 30,000 rebels in the field, but their number increasing faster than ever. And now began their destructive and dreaded work of dynamiting trains, bridges, etc., tearing up tracks and cutting telegraph lines, as also their more systematic levies of "contributions" upon the planters, and of taxes upon food supplies for the cities. More fighting, too, but always of the partisan kind; for unless two or three times the stronger, no insurgent force would either attack or wait to be attacked. They knew every foot of ground; all the negroes and three fourths of the whites formed a spy service for them; and when it came to marching, the imported regulars were nowhere. They worried and stung the Spanish columns and outposts perpetually, always making off before an effective blow could be dealt in return. When their ammunition ran low, they would swoop down upon some exposed party of the enemy and replenish from the prisoners' cartridge-boxes.

RETIREMENT OF CAMPOS.

October saw 25,000 government troops in the province of Santa Clara alone. But in spite of them Gomez rushed his columns by night over into Santa Clara. The combat of November 19th and 20th, at Taguasco, in that province, was the severest encounter of the year, Gomez gaining a decided advantage over Valdes, one of the Spanish brigadiers. Before the end of 1895 Campos' campaign was an admitted failure. Under a heavy fire of criticism from the ultra-Spanish Hayanese because he would not depart from the humane and considerate policy he had all along pursued, the once-lauded "Pacifier of Cuba" at the new year returned to Spain. Both sides now had in the field three times as many men as in the ten years' war, the government about 200,000 men, counting 60,000 volunteers—home guards—and the loosely organized and wonderfully mobile insurgent armies 50,000 to 65,000.

CAMPAIGN OF 1896.

THE TORCH AND GRASS-GROWN FIELDS.

Less blood and more fire gives the second year's campaign in an epigram. The Cuban leaders in December, 1895, had announced that their next move would be to stop production and commerce, and thus deprive the Spanish crown of war revenues and supplies. Thus, too, the situation would become so intolerable that Loyalist and Autonomist would cease opposing independence, for they would see it was the only alternative to anarchy and ruin. So Gomez again took up his line of march westward to the confines of Santa Clara, and across Matanzas, and into the province of the capital; which, as completed by Maceo's lodgment in Pinar del Rio, made a march of triumph for the Cubans of the whole length of their country, or quite as far as from Pittsburg to St. Louis. Gomez had got hold of a few

pieces of artillery, and the thunder of his guns at almost the back door of Havana was the greeting he gave the new governor-general, Valeriano Weyler, who arrived early in February. His march had lain through the cultivated, rich sugar districts, and these he left a smoking desolation. Then Maceo, like a thunderbolt, burst into Pinar del Rio, where he did a corresponding work, though not the same one, in the tobacco regions; and in Pinar del Rio he staid, in spite of all efforts to capture him or starve him out.

THE TROCHAS. Trocha simply means a military line of fortified posts, near together, designed to bar an enemy's passage beyond. The Spaniards always placed great reliance on their trochas as a means of cooping up the enemy, and, as it were, strangling rebellion to death. Yet Gomez in the ten years' war crossed and recrossed them several times, once bringing his wife with him. Those which Campos established in 1895 soon had to be abandoned as useless. His last was along the line of railroad running from Havana to Bat-abano, on the south coast, a distance of twenty-eight miles; and, in addition to the usual forts, hundreds of freight-cars were covered with boiler-iron, their sides perforated with openings for the rifles of his soldiery, and some of these were kept moving up and down the line day and night. On the evening of January 4, 1896, Gomez and Maceo crossed this trocha without firing a shot, but tore up three miles of railroad track, "just to let the Spaniards know we noticed their toy," Gomez remarked.

WEYLER'S TROCHAS. In 1896 Weyler threw two trochas across the island, one in the western part of the province of Puerto Principe (see map), from Jucaro to Moron. The western one was shorter and stronger than any before it, and at first much the most talked of. It extended twenty-three miles from Pto. de Mariel on the north to B. Majana on the south, just within the eastern boundary of Pinar del Rio (see map). Its object was to shut Maceo up in the province just named, and make the assurance doubly sure of cutting the revolutionary army in two. This trocha consisted principally of a barbed-wire fence nearly four feet high; the sentinels being posted immediately behind it. Forty yards back of it was a trench three feet wide and four feet deep, with a breastwork of palmetto logs. Fifty yards still further back were the log houses in which the troops were quartered. The number of soldiers required to guard the whole line was about 15,000.

DEATH OF MACEO. After passing the trocha with a small detachment on the night of December 4, 1896, Maceo (on his way to consult with Gomez) was killed on the seventh; assassinated, the Cubans claimed, through the purchased treachery of Dr. Zertucha, of his personal staff. His eight brothers had all perished before him in the cause of Cuban liberty. General Rius Rivera succeeded him.

CAMPAIGN OF 1897.

SITUATION IN JANUARY. The next year, 1897, dawned upon a situation which for Spain was intensely strained, financially, and scarcely less so from the military and diplomatic stand-points, with gloom and mourning throughout the patriot ranks for the death of Maceo, though the Cuban Junta asserted, a few weeks later, it had received a quarter of a million dollars in the way of increased contributions because of it. "Meanwhile," says a trustworthy account of that period, "in one of the fairest lands on earth the misery, the suffering, goes on without mitigation. Thousands are in sudden extreme penury, many on the verge of starvation, and from one end of the island to the other there is a complete unsettling of everything. Weyler, though he has not proved himself the butcher he was dubbed beforehand, is harsh and relentless, and some of his orders have worked indescribable hardship and privation to multitudes of country people. His forces continue to garrison the seaports, and hold certain interior lines along the railroads, including the western and eastern trochas, but the insurgents have their own way in nearly all of the eastern two thirds of the island, and are able to raid at will over much of the rest."

THE CUBAN ARMIES. The numerical strength of the opposing armies at this time had not greatly changed since the close of 1895. (See page 24.) Additional reinforcements from Spain, though reaching Havana frequently, did not much more than replace the heavy Spanish losses resulting from exposure and disease. The Cuban armies, according to a speech in the United States Congress, in 1896, aggregated 60,622 men, and of the twenty-four generals in the Cuban armies nineteen were whites, three blacks, one a mulatto and one an Indian.

The Senator's figures doubtless exaggerated the insurgent strength. Comparatively few of the fighters on that side could keep in active service the year round. Gomez practically had no commissary department. His men came and went, and scattered about to plant and gather their rapidly grown crops, much as they pleased; it being sufficient, most of the time, that they should keep within call and rally to the main camps whenever notified that any considerable movement was on foot. During the few long marches which the Cuban armies made they had to live, of course, off the country.

PAPER PACIFICATIONS. Upon Maceo's death Weyler put forth increased efforts to crush out rebellion in Pinar del Rio. By means of the western trocha he succeeded in confining Rivera's scattered bands to that province, and in a series of small engagements he gained some advantages; but there was a continuous stream of wounded and sick soldiers back to Havana. In the

spring of 1897 Rivera, wounded, was made a prisoner, after which event military operations in Pinar del Rio became absolutely unimportant. Rivera was released a few months later, and already is well-nigh forgotten. On January 11, 1897, Weyler proclaimed the pacification of the three western provinces, those of Havana, Matanzas and Pinar del Rio; then made haste to show the hollowness of it all, not only by unrelaxed activity in Pinar del Rio, but by a campaign of ruthless devastation throughout Matanzas. His further "pacifications," at intervals during the summer, deceived nobody. As autumn approached, the fruitlessness of his harsh policy aroused strong criticism even in Madrid, from the Liberal Party.

AUTUMN CAMPAIGN.

The two eastern provinces, Santiago and Puerto Principe, were dominated by the insurgents from the very first. It cost the Spaniards continued severe effort and many lives to retain their hold on the Bayamo district, before giving it up, under the exigencies of the war with the United States, April 25, 1898. More than once the garrison of that place was reduced to almost starvation allowances, by the operations of insurgents to the north, thus making them dependent on such supplies as could be brought up the Rio Cauto (see map) by boat. In January, 1897, a Spanish gunboat patrolling that river was blown up by a torpedo operated electrically from the woods along the shore. During the greater part of that year the more important demonstrations of the insurgents were those made by various detachments of the army of General Calixto Garcia, now the next in rank to Gomez, and, like him, a veteran of the ten years' war; though the heavily guarded and formidably strengthened Jucaro-Moron trocha long prevented any junction with the commander-in-chief, who was having a watchful, but by no means sanguinary, time in Santa Clara province; or, as the Cubans call that region, El Camaguey.

CAPTURE OF LAS TUNAS.

Strangely confused and meager were the accounts of military operations in Cuba throughout 1897. The insurgents were playing a waiting game. Their most striking success was Garcia's capture of the important fortified post of Victoria de las Tunas, northwest of Bayamo (see map), on the thirtieth of September, after three days' fighting, in which the Spanish commander was killed, and the beleaguered garrison had a casualty list of forty per cent, the rest surrendering. The Cubans, who also lost heavily, owed their victory to Garcia's recent artillery reinforcements—two heavy and six rapid-fire guns worked by a little band of Americans. A young Missourian, writing home, declared they captured "twenty-one forts, over a thousand rifles, a million rounds of ammunition and two Krupp cannon." As Weyler had cabled that Tunas was "impregnable," its fall occasioned deep chagrin and severe criticism in Madrid; nor did these abate, notwithstanding his early reoccupation of the place, the rebels having left.

RECONCENTRATION HORRORS.

PRESIDENT McKINLEY'S DESCRIPTION.

Not on the prowess of her armies, however, but on her cold-blooded policy of "reconcentration," Spain had long since come to place her main reliance for subduing the rebellion. The Cuban laboring classes, the common country people, all sympathized with the cause of Cuba libre; they must be taken in hand, and put where neither they nor the food they were accustomed to raise could aid the insurgent bands. In his message to Congress April 11, 1898, President McKinley said: "The efforts of Spain added to the horrors of the strife a new and inhuman phase happily unprecedented in the modern history of civilized Christian people. The policy of devastation and concentration, inaugurated by Captain-General Pando on October 21, 1896, in the province of Pinar del Rio, was thence extended to embrace all of the island to which the power of the Spanish arms was able to reach by military occupation or by military operations. The peasantry, including all dwellers in the open agricultural interior, were driven into the garrisoned towns or isolated places held by the troops. The raising and movement of provisions of all kinds were interdicted. The fields were laid waste, dwellings unroofed or fired, mills destroyed, and, in short, everything that could desolate the land and render it unfit for human habitation or support was commanded by one or the other of the contending parties, and executed by all the powers at their disposal."

STARVATION AND SUFFERING.

"By the time the present administration took office, a year ago," continues the President, "reconcentration, so called, had been made effective over the better part of the four central and western provinces, Santa Clara, Matanzas, Havana and Pinar del Rio. The agricultural population, to the estimated number of 300,000 or more, was herded within the towns and their immediate vicinage, deprived of the means of support, rendered destitute of shelter, left poorly clad, and exposed to the most unsanitary conditions.

"As the scarcity of food increased with the devastation of the depopulated areas of production, destitution and want became misery and starvation. Month by month the death-rate increased in alarming ratio. By March, 1897, according to conservative estimates from official Spanish sources, the mortality among the reconcentrados from starvation and the diseases thereto incident exceeded fifty per cent of their total number. No practical relief was accorded to the destitute. The overburdened towns, already suffering from the general dearth, could give no aid. So-called zones of cultivation that were established within the immediate area of effective military control about the cities and fortified camps proved illusory as a remedy for the suffering. The unfortunates, being for the most part women and children, or aged and

helpless men enfeebled by disease and hunger, could not have tilled the soil without tools, seed or shelter, to provide for their own support or for the supply of the cities. Reconcentration worked its predestined result. As I said in my message of last December, it was not a civilized warfare; it was extermination. The only peace it could beget was that of the wilderness and the grave."

CONGRESSIONAL VISITING PARTIES.

Exactly that which had been predicted by the Cuban Junta and the better-informed portion of the American press thus came to pass, only in form more horrid still. "But some doubted," and among them were United States Senators and Congressmen. A party of these, including Senators Proctor of Vermont, Gallinger of New Hampshire, and Thurston of Nebraska, experienced a harrowing awakening when they visited Cuba early in March, 1898, and with their own eyes beheld the hopeless, unspeakable misery of the famishing "reconcentrados;" and the subsequent speeches of these three Senators produced a powerful effect. The wife of Senator Thurston, who accompanied the Congressional party, was in delicate health; her sympathetic nature received so great a shock from the dreadful scenes the party everywhere encountered that she died on the trip.

AMERICAN PROTESTS.

Under the law of nations, had the helpless reconcentrados been fortunate enough to be her prisoners of war, Spain must have provided for them; but as they were only simple peasantry, and mostly women, children and broken-down old men at that, she could and did take steps to starve upward of half a million of them into the grave; and it was no person's business in particular to demand the reason why, till a few wide-awake American newspapers exposed, and kept on exposing, the enormities that were going on. By May, 1898, not less than a quarter of a million reconcentrados had died of slow starvation and disease. Against this abuse of the rights of war the American government repeatedly and earnestly protested. Finally, in October, 1897, the Spanish government conceded certain relief measures (see foot of page 30), and subsequently made a great display of others, but they were miserably inadequate, and did not meet the real situation.

RELIEF MEASURES.

Hundreds of Americans came within the scope of reconcentration. Largely upon the representations of General Fitzhugh Lee, the lion-hearted United States Consul-General at Havana, President McKinley, very early in his administration, requested, and Congress granted, \$50,000 for their relief, including the return to the United States of such of them as desired it. During the autumn of 1897 the conviction grew strong that the Red Cross Association ought to undertake the mitigation of the terrible suffering in Cuba. Clara Barton, president of the American section of that noble organization, was still in Armenia, on relief work there. Return-

ing in the winter, she took up the suggested Cuban work simultaneously with independent movements of similar character. The Government lent its influence to the cause. Several scores of tons of food supplies were donated by private and public benevolence, chiefly in the West, and considerable money was obtained in the East and elsewhere.

THE PRESIDENT'S ACCOUNT.

With exceptional pleasure President McKinley doubtless penned the following paragraphs of his special message of April 11, 1898: "The success which had attended the limited measure of relief extending to the suffering American citizens in Cuba, by the judicious expenditure, through consular agencies, of money appropriated expressly for their succor by the joint resolution approved May 24, 1897, prompted the humane extension of a similar scheme of aid to the great body of sufferers. A suggestion to this end was acquiesced in by the Spanish authorities. On the twenty-fourth of December last I caused to be issued an appeal to the American people, inviting contributions, in money or in kind, for the succor of the starving sufferers in Cuba, following this on the eighth of January by a similar public announcement of the formation of a Central Cuban Relief Committee, with headquarters in New York City, composed of three members representing the American National Red Cross and the religious and business elements of the community."

GOOD WORK IN CUBA.

The message continues: "The efforts of that committee have been untiring, and have accomplished much. Arrangements for free transportation to Cuba have greatly aided the charitable work. The president of the American Red Cross and representatives of other contributory organizations have generously visited Cuba, and co-operated with the Consul-General and the local authorities to make effective disposition of the relief collected through the efforts of the central committee. Nearly \$200,000 in money and supplies has already reached the sufferers, and more is forthcoming. The supplies are admitted duty free, and transportation to the interior has been arranged, so that the relief, at first necessarily confined to Havana and the larger cities, is now extending through most, if not all, of the towns where suffering exists. Thousands of lives have already been saved."

SPANISH RELIEF ILLUSORY.

As a counter to the American government's revolting expose of the policy of reconcentration, the Spanish cabinet, early in April, 1898, voted three million pesetas—upward of \$600,000—for the starving reconcentrados. Consul-General Lee, when questioned by the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate on April 12, 1898, had this to say: "I do not believe \$600,000, in supplies, will be given to those people, and the soldiers left to starve. They will divide it up here and there—a piece taken off here, and a piece taken off there. I

do not believe they have appropriated anything of the kind. The condition of the reconcentrados out in the country is just as bad as in General Weyler's day, except as it has been relieved by supplies from the United States.

"General Blanco published a proclamation rescinding General Weyler's bando, as they call it there, but it has had no practical effect. In the first place, these people have no place to go; the houses have been burned down; there is nothing but the bare land there, and it would take them two months before they could raise the first crop. In the next place, they are afraid to go out from the lines of the towns, because the roving bands of Spanish guerrillas, as they are called, would kill them. So they stick right in the edges of the town, just like they did, with nothing to eat except what they can get from charity."

BLANCO IN CUBA.

SPANISH POLITICS. The so-called Liberal Party of Spain, under the leadership of Sagasta (the same who, as prime minister, once sent word to President Harrison there was not gold enough in the world to buy Cuba) was, to all appearances, gradually undermining the Conservative ministry of Canovas, and had become outspoken in its condemnation of General Weyler's severe and futile measures, when, on August 6, 1897, Canovas was assassinated by an obscure anarchistic crank. A few weeks later came the expected "ministerial crisis," the outcome of which was a new cabinet, under Sagasta, pledged to afford Cuba autonomy—home rule—and at the same time to prosecute the war there with increased vigor.

RECALL OF WEYLER. Early in October Weyler, a Conservative, placed his resignation in the hands of the new ministry, and a few days later was recalled; one reason for this step, according to a semi-official account, being "the deplorable condition of the sick and wounded soldiers arriving from Cuba." Before sailing for Spain Weyler accepted an almost riotous ovation from the volunteers of Havana, the ultra-Spanish element of the city, and responded in a speech full of absurd self-glorification. To what extent his twenty months in Cuba had swelled his private fortune cannot be stated, but it is known to have been quite considerable.

SAGASTA'S PLAY. Sagasta was a man of less commanding intellect than Canovas, but an adroit politician, and a master-hand at the worn-out Spanish game of make-believe and delay. He promised the Washington government many nice things, and really did try to get the Cubans to accept his scheme of autonomy. But the Cuban patriots would have none of it, and, what was no less fatal to it, neither would the Spanish out-and-outers, the Weylerites. However, some twoscore of American prisoners in Cuba were released.

Some of them had been in prison seventeen months, and never brought to trial, but the Queen Regent graciously forgave their crimes anyhow, at President McKinley's request.

BLANCO'S

ADMINISTRATION.

Weyler's successor was not Marshal Campos, as many had predicted it would be, but General Ramon Blanco, late governor-general of the Philippine Islands, where he had been forced to cope with a determined rebellion. In politics he was a Liberal, and in traits of personal character very different from his predecessor. He reached Havana October 31, 1897. He seems to have made an honest effort to carry out the milder policy which, under the pressure of American opinion, had been decided on at Madrid. Before reaching Cuba he had stated, in an interview: "My policy will never include concentration. I fight the enemy, not women and children. One of the first things I shall do will be to greatly extend the zones of cultivation, and to allow the reconcentrados to go out of the towns and till the soil." For the difference at this point between promise and fulfillment General Blanco must not be held alone to blame. The situation has largely overmastered him throughout.

A HOPELESS

SITUATION.

The amnesty proclamation which the governor-general issued on the eighth of November fell flat; the insurgents paid no attention to it. Few were the estates, either, on which he was able to start the mills to grinding sugar-cane once more. Equally inconclusive were his efforts in the field. In its military aspect the war had relapsed into a dogged struggle amid the central provinces, and around the garrisoned points in the two eastern ones. General Pando, in the east, organized the principal expeditions of the winter, and exhausted his ill-rationed columns in gaining petty victories of no lasting value. One cannot help admiring the constancy of the suffering and neglected Spanish soldiery, whose pay in April, 1898, was nine months in arrears for the men and four months for the officers.

FAILURE OF

AUTONOMY.

It was not without difficulty that Blanco manned the several posts of government when, in November, 1897, he took the first steps toward launching the new autonomous administration, on which Sagasta had built such hopes. The real leaders of public opinion held aloof. Many of them denounced autonomy as a weak concession that endangered the whole fabric of Spanish supremacy. The autonomous office-holders—the Colonial government, as high-sounding cablegrams phrase it—are mere puppets, with no influence except as upheld by Spanish bayonets.

CUBAN DETERMINATION.

As to the Cuban leaders, nothing could be more clear-cut than their stern avowal, a hundred times repeated, to consider no proposal along the lines of home rule under Spanish domination. "Independence or death!" has been

their impassioned cry at every step. That it must be independence or nothing, should they have a voice in the settlement, presented diplomacy with a knotty and singularly unwelcome problem. And yet whose right to a voice in the settlement had been better earned? With a terrible emphasis Gomez issued his warning, even before Blanco had ensconced himself in the palace at Havana, that any person attempting to bring offers of autonomy to his camps would be seized as a spy and shot; and in one case at least the summary order was carried out.

THE CUBAN REPUBLIC.

CIVIL GOVERNMENT ORGANIZED.

Marti's death (see page 22) delayed the civil organization of the revolutionists, but on September 13, 1895, their first Constituent Assembly met at Camaguey, with twenty members representing all six provinces. It declared Cuba independent, and adopted a constitution for the new government, whose supreme power was vested in a Government Council, to be composed of the president of the Republic, the vice-president and four secretaries—war, interior, foreign affairs and agriculture—with a sub-treasury for each of these four departments.

It next elected and installed the officers of government. Salvador Cisneros Betancourt, chosen president, was the ex-Marquis of Santa Lucia, who formally renounced his title of nobility when he joined the revolution in 1868, and lost his estates by confiscation. Bartolome Masso, of Manzanillo, was elected vice-president, and Dr. Thomas Estrada Palma, minister plenipotentiary and diplomatic agent abroad, with headquarters in the United States. Gomez was confirmed as general-in-chief of the army, and Maceo as second in command.

QUESADA'S STATEMENTS.

Senor Gonzales de Quesada, charge d'affaires of the Cuban Republic at Washington, is a graduate of the University of New York, and in training thoroughly American. In a recent statement he said: "The civil authorities of the Republic have continued to exercise their functions throughout the territory controlled by the Republic of Cuba, which is about three fourths of the island. There is a civil governor in every province, who has his subordinates and employees. The provinces are divided into prefectures, under the supervision of the secretary of the interior. The duties of the prefects are various and are subject to special laws. That these prefectures are in working operation the official telegrams of the Spanish press afford innumerable proof. Documents on file before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations prove that the civil government legislated as to commerce, government workshops, manufacturing, coast inspectors, post-offices; that stamps have been issued, public schools established, civil marriages provided for; that the public treasury is well organized, taxes being collected, and amounting to

hundreds of thousands of dollars; and that President Cisneros and, afterward, President Masso have issued state papers."

MASSO'S

ADMINISTRATION.

The second Constituent Assembly, which met at the end of the constitutional two years, numbered twenty-four members, elected by ballot on the basis of universal suffrage. It sat during October and November, 1897, Dr. Domingo Mendez Capote, ex-professor of law in Havana University, presiding. Says Quesada: "The outgoing secretaries of state submitted their reports, which were examined and passed upon by committees appointed for the purpose. A new constitution was adopted on October 29, 1897, which will be in force two years, unless independence is obtained before, when an Assembly is to be called to provide temporarily for the government and administration of the Republic until a definite Constituent Assembly shall meet. The constitution determines what is called the Republic, who are citizens, their individual and political rights, the officers of the government, their power, and provides for the assembling of the representatives." For the new term of two years the Assembly chose former Vice-president Bartolome Masso to be president; Dr. Capote, mentioned above, vice-president, and Jose B. Alemen, secretary of war. By the constitution the latter official is "the superior chief in rank of the Army of Liberty."

A PORTABLE

CAPITAL.

Early in the revolution the Cuban capital was set up at Cubitas, which is among the "mountains" of that name north of the city of Puerto Principe (see map). It has been quite itinerant. In January, 1898, when it happened to be at the village of Espanza, in the Cubitas region, it was raided by a heavy Spanish column and captured, "after a stubborn resistance, which gave the rebel officials time to escape."

Consul-General Lee told the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate: "I have never thought that the insurgents had anything except the skeleton form of a government—a movable capital. I asked one day why they did not have some permanent capital, and I think they gave a very good reason. It would require a large force to protect it and defend it, and they could not afford to mass up their men there; so the capital and the government offices had to move where they would be the safest.

HOW THE CUBAN

ARMIES SUBSISTED.

"Whatever may be said about old General Gomez," continued General Lee, "he is, in my humble opinion, fighting the war in the only way it can be fought—scattering his troops out; because to concentrate would be to starve, having no commissary train and no way to get supplies. They come in sometimes for the purpose of making some little raid, where he thinks it will do something; but he has given orders, so I have always been informed, not to fight in masses, not to lose

their cartridges; and sometimes when he gets into a fight each man is ordered to fire not more than two cartridges. The way the insurgents do is this: They have little patches of sweet potatoes—everything grows there very abundantly in a short time—and Irish potatoes and fruits. They drive their pigs and cattle into the valleys and hillsides, and they use those and scatter out. The insurgents plant crops in many parts of the island."

STRAINED DIPLOMACY.

AMERICAN PRESSURE.

President Cleveland tendered Spain his good offices in April, 1896, but they were refused. President McKinley's offers were met less bluntly, but Sagasta was most careful to avoid even a tacit consent to mediation. While he sought to quiet the Washington government with promises and partial reforms in Cuba, the Spanish war office continued putting forth efforts such as for a nation literally bankrupt were surprising, to create a navy overmatching the United States upon the ocean. The growing strength of public opinion in this country was irresistibly impelling the Washington government to a policy of moral coercion, notwithstanding the gratifying release of American prisoners, the superseding of Weyler, and the unfailing suavity of General Stewart L. Woodford, the American minister at Madrid since July, 1897. The American people had virtually lost faith in Spain, and, because of her incapacity and cruelty in Cuba, were fast losing all patience. Official circles, too, showed unmistakable irritation over Spain's pretense that the Cuban war had been so prolonged mainly on account of American failure to enforce neutrality, the facts being this country had already expended \$2,000,000 in Spain's interest in doing just that thing, and had stopped vastly more Cuban expeditions than Spanish gunboats had intercepted.

THE DeLOME LETTER.

Spain's accomplished representative at Washington was Senor Don Enrique DeLome, who had been there for years. A confidential letter that he had written to Senor Canalejas, whom Sagasta had sent over early in the winter to quietly investigate the Washington situation, was stolen from the mail by a Cuban sympathizer in Havana post-office, and sent to the Cuban Junta at New York, by whom carefully photographed copies were made public early in February, 1898. In this letter the Spanish minister abused President McKinley as a "low politician," fatally uncovered the duplicity of his own part in pending negotiations, and distinctly admitted the precariousness of Spain's hold on Cuba. It was impossible, of course, for him to remain at Washington. He cabled his resignation, and it had already been accepted before Minister Woodford went to Sagasta with a "representation." His successor, in March, was Senor Polo, whose father had held the same post many years before.

THE MAINE HORROR.

At forty minutes past nine on Tuesday night, February 15, 1898, the United States battleship Maine, Captain Charles D. Sigsbee commanding, which had been lying quietly at anchor in Havana harbor since the evening of January twenty-fifth, was destroyed by an explosion. Two officers and not less than two hundred and sixty of her crew perished, most of them ground to pieces amid the steel partitions and decks, the others penned by the tangle of wreckage and drowned by the immediate sinking of the wreck. The news caused intense excitement throughout the United States, more especially because treachery was suspected. The Maine was one of the finest (though not largest) ships in the navy, representing, together with her armament and stores, an expenditure approximating five millions of dollars. Seldom, if ever, was there a finer example of self-control on the part of a great people, as for several weeks the United States stood awaiting the official determination of the cause of this appalling calamity.

OFFICIAL FINDINGS.

The government at once organized a naval court of inquiry, composed of experienced officers of high rank, who, in their continuous labor of twenty-three days, were aided by a strong force of wreckers and divers, besides experts. They made a thorough investigation on the spot, sifting and weighing every item of evidence that could be adduced. The type-written testimony made a bundle of twelve thousand pages, weighing about thirty pounds. The unanimous finding of the court, dated March 21, 1898 (as summarized in President McKinley's message of the twenty-eighth of March), was: "That the loss of the Maine was not in any respect due to fault or negligence on the part of any of the officers or members of her crew; that the ship was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine, which caused the partial explosion of two or more of her forward magazines; and that no evidence has been obtainable fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the Maine upon any person or persons."

"The crime or the criminal negligence of the Spanish officials," were essentially the terms in which Congress put the case two weeks later, and in this Congress voiced the conviction of the American people.

AMERICAN WAR PREPARATIONS.

PRECAUTIONARY ACTIVITIES.

Preparations comporting with possible hostilities began to be made in both the army and navy departments in January, 1898, and from the date of the Maine horror were pushed with great energy. The strengthening of coast fortifications and the accumulation and distribution of war material, with recruiting for all branches of service, and arrangements for mobilizing not only the regular army, but the National Guard of the several states, went on apace. There was especial urgency in

strengthening the navy. At government and at contractors' shipyards work was pushed day and night. A naval officer was hurried to Europe to buy up every suitable warship on the market, and other ships were bought in our own ports. In Europe were also purchased hundreds of the smaller cannon and perhaps a thousand tons of ammunition. Old monitors and other discarded craft were overhauled and put in condition for coast defense. A fleet of auxiliary cruisers, and another of patrol-ships, began to be organized. The purchase and conversion of merchant vessels soon counted up into the millions.

On the ninth of March Congress, at the President's request, unanimously voted \$50,000,000 as an emergency fund for the national defense. A few days later it passed a bill adding two regiments of artillery to the regular army; these were sorely needed to man the heavy defensive guns along the Atlantic and Gulf seaboard.

CONGRESS AND THE PEOPLE.

Rid of DeLome's presence, the President magnanimously ignored the DeLome letter. His whole nature shrinking from the responsibility of a bloody war, he even forebore making the Maine tragedy the occasion for more than a "representation" to the court of Madrid. But Congress, reflecting the overwhelming sentiment of the nation, was by this time ablaze with indignation and warlike enthusiasm. Herculean were the efforts of the President to control the storm in the interests of peace, through delay. Public opinion grew imperative. It insisted on definite action. The President's message transmitting the Maine findings was sent to Congress on the twenty-eighth of March. His yet more memorable message of the eleventh of April had been withheld nearly or quite a week, to give time for American residents in Cuba to leave there, and with a lingering hope the situation might yet, in some way, take a pacific turn. In that message the President handed the whole matter over to Congress, and asked for its decision.

JOINT RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS.

After several days of impassioned debate, and a prolonged disagreement between the Senate and House of Representatives over the side question of recognizing the existing Republic in Cuba, the action of Congress was given to the world, April 19, 1898, in the following joint resolution, which was approved by the President the following day:

Joint Resolution—For the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the government of Spain relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these resolutions into effect.

WHEREAS, the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been

a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battleship, with two hundred and sixty-six of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured, as has been set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of April 11, 1898, upon which the action of Congress was invited; therefore,

Resolved, By the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

1. That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of a right ought to be, free and independent.

2. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

3. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several states to such an extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

4. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people.

OPENING OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

INITIAL STEPS. Consul-General Lee, almost the last of the United States officials in Cuba, left Havana on April 9th. Senor Polo, the Spanish minister, requested passports, and left Washington on the 20th, and thirty-two hours later Minister Woodford retired from Madrid. The concentration of the United States regular army at different points on or near the Gulf of Mexico was by this time in general progress. On April 25th Congress passed a bill declaring the existence of war with Spain, dating from the 21st.

RAISING TROOPS. On April 23d President McKinley issued a call for 125,000 two-year volunteers, under authority of an act of Congress passed the day previous. The second call bore date May 25th, and was for 75,000 men. Adding to these calls ten regiments of "immunes," with certain other volunteers specially authorized by Congress, also the 61,000 regulars actually in service or in process of recruiting, the military forces of the country shortly attained a nominal strength of 277,500. Considerable additions were also made to the naval strength, especially for patrol service along the Atlantic seaboard.

WAR FINANCIERING.

The House of Representatives hurriedly passed a bill for raising war revenues, as early as April 20th, but the Senate was so deliberate and the disagreements so marked that a law for that purpose was not enacted until June 10th. It authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to issue certificates of indebtedness, to an amount not exceeding \$100,000,000 outstanding at any one time, and \$400,000,000 in bonds, the former as well as the latter to draw three per cent interest; directed the coinage of silver from the bullion stored in the government vaults at the rate of \$1,500,000 a month, and imposed direct taxes, including stamp duties, estimated to produce a revenue of from \$150,000,000 to upward of \$200,000,000 per annum. The government immediately placed \$200,000,000 of bonds on the market in the form of a "popular loan" at par, with the result that by July 15th the amount had been subscribed more than four times over. Ninety millions were allotted to bidders for \$500 or less.

CUTTING CABLES.

On May 11th four boats' crews of Americans engaged at the entrance of Cienfuegos harbor, Cuba, in cutting the submarine telegraph between Havana and Santiago, were fired upon from the shore and one man killed and six wounded. The fire was vigorously returned by the blockading vessels Marblehead and Nashville, and converted revenue cutter Windom, and the cable-cutting completed. It was not until the second week of July, however, that the utmost efforts of the Americans succeeded in cutting the last remaining cable between Cuba and the Old World, thus isolating General Blanco at Havana. The cable from Havana to Key West and New York has not been interfered with by either side.

RAPID WORK.

In four weeks, ending June 12th, the Subsistence Department loaded twelve solid miles of freight-cars with provisions for the United States armies, being a total of 32,180 tons—in all 19,123,645 rations (the ration representing a soldier's food allowance for one day). Results equally striking were secured in the Ordnance and Quartermaster's Departments.

THE CUBAN BLOCKADE.**INSTITUTING
THE BLOCKADE.**

The first aggressive step of the war was the blockade proclaimed by President McKinley on April 22d, covering the north coast of Cuba westward from Cardenas to Bahia Honda, a distance of about one hundred and twenty miles, with Havana a little west of the central point and also including the port of Cienfuegos, on the south coast. To enforce it the North Atlantic squadron, Captain (now rear admiral) W. T. Sampson commanding, sailed for Key West the same day, capturing the first prize within two hours, the Spanish merchantman Buena Ventura,

laden with Texas lumber. Eight additional prizes were taken within the next two days; at the end of one week this number had more than doubled, to the aggregate value of upward of \$3,000,000.

EXTENDING THE BLOCKADE.

About May 1st Commodore John C. Watson was assigned the duty of enforcing the Havana blockade, heavy work having been cut out for Acting Admiral Sampson in other waters, but in the course of a month he was in turn relieved by Commodore John A. Howell, in preparation for his assignment to the Eastern squadron, which was about to be organized for a descent on the Spanish coast. Despite a few lapses, the blockade of Havana and the other north coast ports was well maintained. But on the southern coast were many ports, mostly small ones, still open to receive whatever supplies from Mexico, Jamaica and Yucatan could be slipped in. To cut off this supply source, President McKinley, on June 28th, proclaimed an extension of the blockade to all the ports on the south coast of Cuba from Cape Frances eastward to Cape Cruz inclusive (see map), and also of San Juan in Porto Rico.

INCIDENTS.

On the night of April 25th two small Spanish steamers, creeping along the coast, slipped into Havana, and on the 26th the large Spanish mail steamer *Montserrat*, bringing \$800,000 in silver and eighteen large guns, and which had doubled back from near Havana, safely landed 1,000 Spanish troops and her valuable cargo at Santiago. May 6th the French steamer *Lafayette* was captured as a blockade runner, but was immediately released by the government.

The first bombardment of shore batteries, which soon became so common an event, was made April 27th off Matanzas, by the cruisers *New York* (Sampson's flag-ship) and *Cincinnati*, and the monitor *Puritan*. May 11th a miniature engagement in Cardenas harbor resulted in the disablement of the United States torpedo-boat *Winslow*, the death of Ensign Bagley and four men and the wounding of others.

ORGANIZING THE PHILIPPINE CONQUEST.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

The Philippines lie southeast of the continent of Asia, in a direct line between Australia and the island of Formosa, on the Chinese coast, some 1,200 miles from the former, but coming within 200 miles of the latter. Their nearest neighbor is the island of Borneo, on the southwest; the island of New Guinea lies further off to the southeast. Stretching almost a thousand miles from north to south, the Philippines reach to within 350 miles of the equator, and are thus in the same latitude as Central America. More important than all the rest put together, the island of Luzon, in the north, is believed to be larger than the state of Ohio, and to contain at least four million inhabitants. The next in size is Mindanao, in the south, with a few Spanish villages on the coast, but otherwise little

known. While the Philippines number altogether some 1,200 islands, less than half are said to admit of permanent habitation, and only a dozen are of any considerable size. Their land area more than equals that of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois combined, and the larger islands, especially Luzon, though for the most part hilly or even mountainous, are very fertile. The archipelago was named after Philip II., the oppressor of Holland and the husband of England's bloody Queen Mary, and for three and one third centuries it remained almost uninterruptedly under the rule of Spain, in spite of whose bad government it latterly became a valuable source of revenue to the crown, and of enrichment to the haughty and grasping Spanish officials.

POPULATION. Estimates of the population vary from 7,000,000 to 15,000,000, composed principally of various Malay tribes, with very few of the aboriginal negritos (Oriental dwarfish negroes) still remaining. There is a considerable infusion of mixed blood, and of late years the Chinese, in spite of all restrictions, have become quite numerous in Luzon and neighboring islands. Outside of the army the pure Spaniards in the Philippines number less than 10,000.

INSURGENTS. The native-born of Spanish descent are much more numerous than the peninsulars, and, as in Cuba, this is the class which has repeatedly flamed into insurrection. Their leader in 1897-98 was the well-educated Aguinaldo, and they have the general support of the native tribes, who, notwithstanding a thin veneering of Roman Catholicism, are only half tamed and deeply resentful of Spanish abuses. They are practically unarmed except for the long, heavy knife carried by the Malays everywhere. Reinforced by many thousands direct from Cadiz and Barcelona, the Spanish troops were nevertheless in hot work still, when, in November, 1897, the insurgent chiefs were bought off with \$400,000, cash in hand, and the promise of certain administrative reforms. These promises, they now declare, like all reform promises from Spain, have not been kept.

CITY AND BAY OF MANILA. On the beautiful land-locked sea which indents the west coast of the island of Luzon, and is large enough to float the navies of the world, the Spaniards for centuries have had their capital. Manila has grown to a population (with its suburbs) of 250,000, and attained vast commercial importance. For Spain, the Philippines have not only been the seat of empire, but the center of trade for the whole Pacific ocean; and whether from the commercial, political or military standpoint, Manila is the Philippines. From this emporium are shipped great quantities of cigars (whose manufacture was, till 1882, a government monopoly), sugar, tobacco, coffee, hemp, cocoa, rice, mats and cordage, and cotton or mixed fabrics. Here is a university conducted by the Dominican order of monks, an imposing cathedral, and the governor-general's palace, whence issued orders to the lieutenant-governor of each of the nine

or ten larger islands, and to the alcaldes of the forty-three provinces comprised in Spain's island empire in the Far East. A submarine cable connects Manila with the rest of the world by way of Hong Kong, China, thence to Singapore, capital of the British colony known as the "Straits Settlement," at the tip of the Malay peninsula, then to and eight hundred miles across India, and on to the Red sea and Europe.

The bay of Manila, dotted continually with the shipping of many nations, narrows at its entrance to a width of twelve miles. Several islands, of which Corregidor and Caballo are the two largest, stand right in the entrance. Ships practically use only the two channels known as Bocha Grande, five miles wide, and Bocha Chico, two miles wide. Manila is situated twenty-six miles northeast of the entrance, or by the concave eastern shore-line of the bay perhaps forty miles.

FORTIFICATIONS. The south third of the city is the older and official part. This portion is fortified, but no fortifications

protect the rest of the city (that part north of the Pasig river), which is the Manila of modern commerce. On the antiquated fortifications of the official city the Spaniards mounted some heavy guns during the winter of 1897-98. They also strengthened the shore batteries, especially those at Cavite, an outlying suburb at the tip of a promontory, seven miles below Manila, and toward the entrance of the bay. The forts on Corregidor island were showily elaborated, and some large guns put in place. In April, 1898, the Spaniards sunk mines in the harbor, and gave out that they were stringing torpedoes across both the main channel, Bocha Grande, and the narrower one of Bocha Chico.

COMMODORE DEWEY. In December, 1897, the navy department relieved Commodore George Dewey, president

of the Board of Inspection and Survey, from duty at Washington, and assigned him the command of the Asiatic squadron, comprising the greater part of the American fleet in the Pacific ocean. Known to his friends in civil life as a quiet, unassuming gentleman of sixty-one, the new commander, in forty-three years of efficient and more than usually varied service, beginning with a cadetship from Vermont, and including thrilling experiences under Admiral Farragut in the Civil War, had won the highest confidence of the naval authorities. The Asiatic squadron assembled at Hong Kong, China, a port belonging to Great Britain. It was well supplied with ammunition and stores, and early in April received quite an accession in the cruiser Baltimore, which also brought a ship-load of ammunition that the government had dispatched from San Francisco on the gunboat Bennington, which vessel transferred it at Honolulu to the Baltimore.

IN MIRS BAY. Warned to leave Hong Kong by the British officials, from neutrality considerations, the American fleet, on

the twenty-seventh of April, moved thirty odd miles northward to Mirs bay, in Chinese jurisdiction, and there completed its preparations, also

awaiting, meanwhile, the arrival of Mr. O. F. Williams, the American consul at Manila, whence he was known to have already sailed. Its commander had been cabled from Washington that war was actually on, and been given instructions, foreshadowed previously, to crush the Spanish fleet in the Pacific and take the Philippines. The details of this momentous undertaking were left to his own judgment.

AMERICAN FLEET. Dewey had six fighting vessels and three tenders, as follows, the first-named being the flag-ship:

	DISPLACE- MENT, TONS.	SPEED, KNOTS.	GUNS, TOTAL	TORPEDO TUBES.
OLYMPIA, first-class protected cruiser, Capt. Chas. V Gridley	5,870	21½	38	6
BALTIMORE, protected cruiser, Capt. N. M. Dyer.	4,413	20	24	4
RALEIGH, protected cruiser, Capt. J. B. Coghlan.....	3,213	19	25	4
BOSTON, protected cruiser, Capt. F. Wildes.....	3,000	15½	20	
CONCORD, gunboat, Commander A. S. Walker.....	1,710	17	15	6
PETREL, gunboat, Commander E. P. Wood.....	892	11½	11	

The converted revenue cutter McCulloch accompanied the fleet as dispatch-boat, as did also the transport Nanshan, laden with coal for it, and the supply-boat Zafiro. The combined fleet carried ten 8-inch guns, twenty-three 6-inch, twenty 5-inch and fifty-six guns of smaller caliber, besides twenty-four gatlings or machine-guns—133 in all.

SPANISH BOMBAST. The Spanish squadron at Manila had been reinforced about the twentieth of April by the cruiser Castilla, whose officers lent enthusiastic assistance to the work of harbor defense, by means of the torpedoes and other war supplies which she had brought from Spain. Thus encouraged, General Augusti, the governor-general, fulminated an absurdly bombastic proclamation, declaring:

"The North American people, constituted of all social excrescences, have exhausted our patience and provoked war by their perfidious machinations, their acts of treachery, their outrages against the law of nations and international conventions. The struggle will be short and decisive. Spain will emerge triumphant from the new test, humiliating and blasting the hopes of the adventurers from those United States, that, without cohesion, without history, offer only infamous traditions and ungrateful spectacles in her chambers, in which appear insolence, defamation, cowardice and cynicism. Her squadron, manned by foreigners, possesses neither instruction nor discipline."

THE SPANISH FLEET.

Admiral Montijo had in his fleet the following vessels, the first-named being his flag-ship:

	DISPLACE- MENT, TONS.	SPEED, KNOTS.	GUNS, TOTAL.	TORPEDO TUBES.
REINA MARIE CHRISTINA, steel cruiser	3,520	17½	21	5
CASTILLA, steel cruiser.....	3,342	14	22	2
VELASCO, small cruiser.....	1,152	14½	7	
DON ANTONIO DE ULLOA, small cruiser	1,130	14	13	2
DON JUAN DE AUSTRIA, small cruiser	1,130	14	13	
ISLA DE CUBA, small cruiser	1,130	16	12	3
ISLA DE LUZON, small cruiser....	1,030	16	12	3
GENERAL LEZO, gunvessel.....	524	11½	6	1
EL CANO, gunvessel.....	524	11½	7	1
MARQUES DEL DUERO, dispatch- boat	500	10		

In number the guns of the Spanish fleet were inferior, and still more so in caliber; but this disparity in Dewey's favor was counter-balanced, as the Spaniards believed, by their shore batteries.

COMMODORE DEWEY'S GREAT VICTORY.**THE VOYAGE TO
MANILA BAY.**

The American fleet left Mirs bay Wednesday afternoon, April 27th. At daylight of Saturday, April 30th, it was sighted off Cape Bolinao, something over 100 miles from Manila. It had already sailed over 500 miles. It proceeded steadily southward, and early in the afternoon reached Subic bay, thirty miles above the entrance to Manila harbor. This was where Admiral Montijo had taken position, in bravado, a few days earlier; but he was not here now, having prudently retired on Friday to Manila bay, within the encircling protection of the forts on shore. Leaving Subic bay between four and five o'clock in the afternoon, the American vessels stood out to sea, and in due time were lost to view.

**FORCING THE
ENTRANCE.**

The night was calm, with a young moon half way to the full. Between one and two o'clock in the morning—Sunday morning, May 1st—the booming of guns was heard in Manila from the direction of Corregidor island, at the entrance to the bay. But it was dawn before it became generally known that the Americans, with inconceivable daring, had entered the bay by the main channel (Bocha Grande), and had come fairly up to the city. In spite of forts, mines and torpedoes, the American fleet, unharmed, was safely within the harbor a feat almost unparalleled in naval warfare. The flag-ship leading, and all lights darkened, almost the entire fleet passed in before the Corregidor forts discovered it.

BATTLE OF MANILA.

As in all tropical countries, daylight came on with a rush. Changing position, the American vessels were soon facing the fortified promontory of Cavite and the Spanish fleet, whose line rested on that point at the left, and thence stretched northward, under the shore batteries, toward the city. Before six o'clock the battle began. The actual fighting was compressed into four hours. A lull occurred in the middle of it, while the Americans steamed across toward the west side of the bay—to establish quarters for their wounded on land, as the watchers, with their spy-glasses, in Manila thought—and from their supply-ships, anchored in the center of the bay, replenished their coal and ammunition. Notwithstanding the disasters which had befallen their side, the Spaniards fondly hoped the enemy had been beaten off, and joyful telegrams were hurried to Madrid. But the dreaded Americans soon returned, when the carnage for one side became terrific.

Before one o'clock the fire from Cavite point had been silenced, its seaward fortifications knocked into shapeless heaps. The Spanish fleet in the Philippines was a tale of the past. Its flag-ship, the *Reina Marie Christina*, fired by American shells, was completely burned. The next largest vessel, the *Castilla*, met the same fate. Other shells crashed through the side of the *Don Juan de Austria* and exploded, and she, too, went up in flames. A number of other vessels were sunk, among them the armed transport *Mindanao*. Montijo, when the flag-ship took fire, had been obliged to shift his flag to the little gunboat *Isla de Cuba*, and that also was destroyed a little later. He was wounded, though not seriously. The loss of life in his command was frightful. The captain of the *Reina Marie Christina* was killed, and over one hundred of his crew, besides some officers. The captain of the *Don Juan de Austria* was also killed, with ninety of his men.

Not one American ship was seriously injured, thanks to the wretched gunnery of the forts on shore, though the Spanish seamen made a brave effort to avert their doom. The skilful manœuvring of the American vessels (in an ellipse) not only mystified the enemy, but much increased his difficulty in getting range. Their fire was delivered with wonderful precision, and such rapidity as fairly overwhelmed the Spaniards, while it amazed the onlookers from shore.

DETAILS AND RESULTS.

The immunity of the Americans was marvelous—none killed and but eight wounded, though the lamented death of Captain Gridley, of the *Olympia*, on June 4th, was at least hastened by some obscure accident or strain during the battle. Two powerful submarine mines were harmlessly exploded in front of the *Olympia* just before the fight began. The *Baltimore* was set on fire by the explosion of a Spanish shell among some ammunition, but the flames were quickly put out. As for the lull in the battle, that

now famous incident was by orders, to allow the American seamen to get breakfast, the men having had only a cup of coffee before going into action. After this lull they came to closer quarters with the enemy, and when the larger of the Spanish vessels had been destroyed the gunboat *Petrel* finished the work among the smaller ones inshore and at the mouth of Bakor bay, behind the promontory at Cavite. The Spanish losses were variously estimated at 900 to 1,200 men. In money value they reached \$6,000,000, without including the Spanish vessel *Argos* or the revenue gunboat *Callao*, the one destroyed and the other captured a few days later. Additional captures of small Spanish vessels were made during the following weeks.

AFTER THE VICTORY.

In the afternoon the British consul went to meet the victorious commander, bearing an earnest plea, on behalf of his consular colleagues, to spare Manila from bombardment. Commodore Dewey conditioned the desired promise upon the surrender of the torpedoes, guns and military stores in the hands of the Spaniards, the supply of coal for his ships and equal privileges in the use of the cable. General Augusti, after communicating with Madrid, defiantly refused. This was on Monday morning. Before nightfall the Americans had seized Corregidor island, thus securing their rear, and had received the formal surrender of Cavite, with its military and naval stores, dry-docks, etc., and hundreds of the Spanish wounded. That afternoon the cable was cut by Dewey's orders, in retaliation for the beaten enemy's refusal to allow him its use. The first impatiently awaited dispatches from the victorious American were not received till Saturday, May 7th; they came by way of Hong Kong, and their publication created boundless enthusiasm. The one bearing the date May 4th contained the weighty sentence, "I control the bay completely, and can take the city at any time."

THE PHILIPPINE EXPEDITIONS.

HONORS AND AID FOR DEWEY.

Pursuant to the president's recommendation, Congress on May 9th passed a resolution of thanks to Commodore Dewey and to his officers and men. It also appropriated \$10,000 to present him a sword, and medals to all under his command. Two days later he was nominated and confirmed rear admiral. Meanwhile preparations were being pushed for dispatching 20,000 American troops from San Francisco, under Major-General Wesley Merritt, of the regular army, whose selection as military governor of the Philippines was made public May 12th, though he did not reach San Francisco until the 27th. The cruiser *Charleston*, the earnest of coming reinforcements, sailed from Mare island navy-yard, San Francisco, for Manila bay May 21st.

**SUCCESSIVE
EXPEDITIONS.**

On May 25th the transport steamers *City of Peking*, *City of Sydney* and *Australia* left San Francisco with the first Philippine expedition, under the command of Brigadier-General Thomas M. Anderson. They carried 115 officers and 2,386 enlisted men, with a year's supplies, besides more ammunition and stores for Dewey's fleet. This expedition reached its destination June 30th, and went into comfortable quarters at Cavite.

The second expedition, which sailed June 15th, was composed of 158 officers and 3,428 enlisted men, under Brigadier-General F. V. Greene, the transports being the *China*, *Colon*, *Zealandia* and *Senator*. It reached Manila bay July 20th. Some detachments were taken ashore near Cavite and Malate, south of Manila, while the rest landed at Malabon, just north of the city.

Meanwhile, on June 6th, the powerful monitor *Monterey*, accompanied by the collier steamer *Brutus*, with a strong towing "bridle," had started for Manila, and on the 23d it was followed by the monitor *Monadnock* and collier *Nero*.

The third Philippine expedition, Brigadier-General Arthur McArthur in command, left San Francisco June 27th, consisting of 197 officers, 4,650 enlisted men and 35 civilians. The steamers were the *Indiana*, *City of Para*, *Ohio*, *Morgan City* and *Valencia*.

Of the fourth expedition the first detachment, numbering 1,763 officers and men, left July 14th on the *City of Puebla* and *Pern*, on the former being Major-General Elwell S. Otis and staff. Brigadier H. G. Otis, with the rest of the expedition, on the *Pennsylvania*, *St. Paul* and *City of Rio Janeiro*, sailed several days later.

The fifth (and, for the present, last) expedition was billed for departure early in August.

General Merritt sailed from San Francisco June 29th, on the steamer *Newport*, expecting after the capture of Manila to devolve the command of the troops upon Major-General Otis, in order to devote himself wholly to the duties of military governor.

**SITUATION
AT MANILA.**

During the three months following his great victory Commodore Dewey won new laurels by his ability as diplomat and administrator. His position was a very delicate one, not only as regarded the representatives of European powers with whom he had to deal, but also the insurgents, who, under Aguinaldo, made wonderful progress, taking outpost after outpost from the Spaniards, and at length obliging them to withdraw at almost every point within the fortifications of Old Manila. While Aguinaldo's attitude after proclaiming himself dictator, in July, occasioned them some solicitude, and yet more the airs put on by the officers of the formidable German squadron in Manila bay, all Americans reposed unbounded confidence in both the shrewdness and the pluck of Admiral Dewey.

CERVERA'S FATAL CRUISE.

ITS MYSTERY AND COMING.

On April 29th the Cape Verde Spanish fleet, under Admiral Cervera, steamed westward under warning to leave from the Portuguese government. It consisted of four first-class armored cruisers and three torpedo-boat destroyers (as starred in the list of Spanish war-vessels given elsewhere). Great secrecy shrouded its movements. May 10th Madrid telegraphed that it had returned to Cadiz. Meanwhile, however, Sampson, with his heavier-armored vessels, had sailed for Porto Rico, where, on May 12th, he bombarded the seaward forts guarding San Juan; then drew off, awaiting orders or—Cervera. Cervera actually turned up in the West Indies that same day. On the 13th he coaled off the French island of Martinique, four hundred miles southeast of Porto Rico, and on the 15th off Curacao, a Dutch West Indian island near the Venezuelan coast. On the 19th, to the boundless joy of Havana and Madrid, he gained the port of Santiago de Cuba.

BOTTLED UP AT SANTIAGO.

May 12th Commodore W. S. Schley, commanding the Flying squadron, at Hampton Roads, Virginia, sailed southward, and within twelve days had Cervera bottled up at Santiago. Admiral Sampson joined him there on June 1st, and took command of the combined fleet of sixteen vessels, and continued the work of periodical bombarding that Schley had begun. The blockade of the harbor entrance by day and by night was unceasingly vigilant—wearry work, but amply rewarded at last. June 3d witnessed the immortal feat of Assistant Naval Constructor Richmond Pearson Hobson and his crew of seven heroes, in sinking the collier Merrimac to block Cervera's egress. They were exchanged July 6th.

FINAL DOOM.

To escape the impending fate of Santiago, Cervera was ordered to dash out of the harbor. The attempt was made on Sunday forenoon, July 3d, his flag-ship, the Infanta Maria Teresa, leading. The Vizcaya, Cristobal Colon and Almirante Oquendo followed, in the order named, and then the torpedo-boat destroyers Pluton and Furor. In the shortest time possible the American vessels closed in and began the chase, firing prodigiously. Within twenty minutes the Furor was beached, and both it and the Pluton sunk. The Infanta Maria Teresa, on fire, was run ashore six and one half miles west of Santiago harbor entrance; the Almirante Oquendo, on fire, seven miles west, and the Vizcaya, on fire, fifteen miles west. The Cristobal Colon, finally overhauled, was beached and surrendered forty-eight miles west of the same port. The destruction was complete. Not less than 500 Spaniards were killed and drowned, including many officers, and nearly 1,500 taken prisoners, among them the broken-hearted admiral, whose kindness to Hobson now stood him in good stead.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.

GUANTANAMO BAY.

The primary object of the land campaign against Santiago was the capture or destruction of Cervera's fleet. To secure a harbor for the coming transports that should be safe against possible cyclones, Sampson determined to seize the bay of Guantanamo, thirty-six miles east. Here, on Fisherman's Point, six hundred United States marines landed on June 10th under Lieutenant-Colonel Huntington, and had four days' fighting.

SHAFTER'S LANDING AND ADVANCE.

On Monday, June 20th, the Fifth United States Army Corps, Major-General William R. Shafter commanding, arrived off Santiago on thirty transports sent from Tampa, Florida, under a strong convoy. Its official strength of 773 officers and 14,564 enlisted men was before the surrender increased to about 22,500. With the navy's assistance, first Baiquiri, the principal landing-place, and then Siboney, were seized. On the 24th occurred the desperate fight in the pathless chaparral surrounding La Quasima, in which the First United States Volunteer Cavalry (the famous Rough Riders) and the First and Tenth regular cavalry, all fighting dismounted, sustained a loss of 16 killed and 52 wounded. The American advance was pushed steadily. The Spaniards, withdrawing to their fortified lines near Santiago, made a determined stand at El Caney and the heights of San Juan, the former northeast and the latter southeast of the city. To capture these apparently impregnable positions cost the severest struggle of the campaign, one continued from dawn till nearly dark of July 1st, with further fighting on the 2d to hold them. General Shafter officially reported 1,593 killed, wounded and missing in the two-days' battle.

THE SURRENDER.

General Linares having been wounded and the next ranking officer killed, the command of the Spanish forces devolved on General Jose Toral, who, after repeated refusals, finally yielded to the inevitable, and on July 15th agreed to surrender. General Shafter occupied Santiago on the 17th—not a day too soon, for yellow fever had begun its work among his men. Toral gave up the eastern end of Cuba and a total force of about 24,000, all of whom the American government agreed to return to Spain at once.

THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN.

THE PLACE OF LANDING.

An expedition of 30,000 troops to Porto Rico, under the personal direction of Major-General Nelson A. Miles, commanding the United States army, came next in order. Its advance, brought over by General Miles from Santiago (troops who had not been landed), seized Guanica, on the south coast, fifteen miles west of Ponce, on the 25th of July.

UNITED STATES WAR-VESSELS.

(See "Kinds of War-ships," page 59. Also "Naval Terms Explained," page 57.)

First-class Battleships.

	Displace't, Tons.	Speed, Knots.	Guns, Total.	Torpedo Tubes.
Iowa.....	11,410	16	46	6
Indiana.....	10,288	15½	46	6
Massachusetts.....	10,288	15	46	6
Oregon.....	10,288	15	46	6

Second-class Battleship.

Texas.....	6,315	17	20	4
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Armored Cruisers

Brooklyn.....	9,271	20	40	5
New York.....	8,200	21	34	3

Armored Ram.

Katahdin.....	2,155	17	4	..
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Protected Steel Cruisers.

Albany (Detained in England.)				
Atlanta.....	3,000	15½	22	..
Baltimore.....	4,413	20	24	4
Boston.....	3,000	15½	20	..
Charleston.....	3,730	18	22	4
Chicago.....	4,500	15	31	..
Cincinnati.....	3,213	19	23	4
Columbia.....	7,375	23	31	5
Minneapolis.....	7,375	23½	31	5
Newark.....	4,098	19	30	6
New Orleans.....	3,600	20	28	3
Olympia.....	5,870	21½	34	6
Philadelphia.....	4,324	19½	29	4
Raleigh.....	3,213	19	25	4
San Francisco.....	4,098	19½	29	6
Topeka (Purchased in England.)				

Unprotected Steel Cruisers.

Detroit.....	2,080	18½	18	3
Marblehead.....	2,089	18½	19	3
Montgomery.....	2,089	19½	19	3

Principal Steamers now Auxiliary Cruisers.

St. Louis.....	11,629 (American Line)			
St. Paul.....	11,630 (American Line)			
Harvard.....	11,674 (American Line)			
	(Formerly New York.)			
Yale.....	11,668 (American Line)			
	(Formerly City of Paris.)			
Prairie.....	4,525 (Morgan Line)			
	(Formerly El Sol.)			
Yosemite.....	4,650 (Morgan Line)			
	(Formerly El Sol.)			
Yankee.....	4,650 (Morgan Line)			
	(Formerly El Norte.)			
Dixie.....	4,665 (Morgan Line)			
	(Formerly El Rio.)			

Double-turret Monitors.

Amphitrite.....	3,990	12	14	..
Minotomoh.....	3,990	10½	10	..
Monadnock.....	3,990	14½	11	..
Monterey.....	4,084	13½	16	..
Puritan.....	6,000	12½	18	..
Terror.....	3,990	12	12	..

Gunboats.

Bennington.....	1,710	17½	14	6
Castine.....	1,177	16	11	1
Concord.....	1,710	17	15	6
Helen.....	1,392	13	18	1

Gunboats—Continued.

	Displace't, Tons.	Speed, Knots.	Guns, Total.	Torpedo Tubes.
Maehias.....	1,177	15½	16	1
Nashville.....	1,371	14	16	1
Petrel.....	892	11½	11	..
Wilmington.....	1,392	13	18	..
Yorktown.....	1,710	16	14	6

Composite Gunboats.

Annapolis.....	1,000	12	12	..
Marietta.....	1,000	12	12	..
Newport.....	1,000	12	12	..
Princeton.....	1,000	12	12	..
Vicksburg.....	1,000	12	12	..
Wheeling.....	1,000	12	12	..

Dynamite Cruisers.

Vesuvius.....	929	21½	6	..
Buffalo (Bought from Brazil.)				
	(Formerly the Netheroy.)			

Special Class.

Bancroft.....	839	14½	11	2
	(Training ship.)			
Dolphin.....	1,486	15½	8	..
	(Dispatch-boat.)			
Torpedo Cruiser

Torpedo-boats.

Bailey.....	235	30	4	2
T. A. M. Craven ..	146	30½	4	3
Cushing.....	105	22½	3	3
Dahlgren.....	146	30½	4	3
Davies.....	128	22½	2	2
Dupont.....	180	27½	4	3
Erlerson.....	120	24	3	3
Farragut.....	273	30	6	3
Foote.....	142	24½	3	3
Fox.....	128	22½	2	4
Goldsborough.....	247½	30	4	2
Gwin.....	46½	20	1	2
Mackenzie.....	65	20	1	2
McKee.....	65	20	1	2
Morris.....	103	22½	3	4
Porter.....	180	27½	4	3
Rodgers.....	142	24½	3	3
Rowan.....	182	26	4	3
Somers (Detained in England.)				
Stiletto.....	31	18		3
Stringham.....	340	30	7	2
Talbot.....	46½	20	1	3
Winslow.....	112	24½	3	3

Submarine Torpedo-boats.

Plunger.....	168	8	..	2
Holland Diver				

Old Monitors (Coast Defense).

Under this head are thirteen single-turret veterans of the Civil War, as follows: Ajax, Canonieus, Catskill, Comanche, Jason, Lehigh, Mahopae, Manhattan, Montauk, Nahant, Nanuet, Passaic and Wyandotte. Their speed is five to six knots, and each has an armament of two heavy smooth-bores, except the Canonieus, which has four.

ADDITIONAL VESSELS.—We also have the old iron vessels (available for coast-defense) Alert, 1,020 tons; Monocacy, 1,370 tons; Ranger, 1,020 tons; Michigan, 685 tons; Pinta, 550 tons. Incomparably more important is the large number of recently acquired auxiliary cruisers of small or moderate size, steam yachts (valuable for their speed, and armored), patrol-boats of various kinds for coast service, tugs, etc. The Treasury Department also has in commission thirty-nine revenue cutters, a number of which (as the McCulloch, under Admiral Dewey) have been transferred to the naval service. For war-ships now building see page 52.

SPANISH WAR-VESSELS.

First-class Battleship.

	Displace't, Tons.	Speed, Knots.	Guns, Total.	Torpedo Tubes.
Pelayo.....	9,900	16	35	7

Second-class Battleships.

Vitoria.....	7,250	11 (Quite old.)		
Numancia.....	7,000	8 (Coast def.)		

Armored Cruisers.

Emperador Car- los V.....	9,235	20	26	6
Cardinal Cisue- ros.....	7,000	20	21	8
Cataluna.....	7,000	20	21	8
Princess de As- turias.....	7,000	20	24	8
Almirante Oquendo*.....	7,000	20	30	8
Infanta Maria Teresa*.....	7,000	20½	30	8
Vizcaya*.....	7,000	20	30	8
Cristobal Colon*.....	6,810	20	40	4

Protected Cruisers.

Alfonso XIII.....	5,000	20	25	5
Lepanto.....	4,826	20	25	5

Unprotected Cruisers.

Aragon.....	3,342	14	14	2
Navarra.....	3,312	14	16	2
Alfonso XII.....	3,090	17½	23	5
Reina Mercedes†	3,090	17½	21	5
Conde de Ven- adito.....	1,130	11	13	..
Infante Isabel.....	1,130	14	13	..
Isabel II.....	1,130	14	13	..
Marques de En- senada.....	1,030	15	13	4
Quiras.....	315	In the Pacific		
Villabolas.....	315	"	"	"

Gunboats for Cuban Waters.

Hernan Cortes..	300	12	1	..
Pizarro.....	300	12	2	..
Vasco Nunez de Balboa.....	300	12½	1	..
Diego Velasquez	200	12	3	..
Ponce de Leon..	200	12	3	..
Alvarado.....	100	12	2	..
Sandoval.....	100	12	2	..

There were eighteen other small steel gunboats, each carrying two guns.

Gunvessels.

	Displace't, Tons.	Speed, Knots.	Guns, Total.	Torpedo Tubes.
Magellanes.....	524	11½	7	1
General Concha	520 (Gunboat.)			

Torpedo-gunboats.

Don Alvaro de Bezun.....	830	Twelve to seventeen knots	8	4
Dona Maria de Molina.....	830		8	4
Destructor.....	458		4	2
Filipinas.....	750		6	3
Galicia.....	571		6	3
Marques de la Victoria.....	830		8	4
Marques de Mo- lina.....	571		6	3
Martin Alonzo Pinzon.....	571		6	3
Nueva Espana... Rapido.....	630 570		6 6	3 3
Temerario.....	590		6	3
Vincente Yanez Pinzon.....	571		6	2

Torpedo-boat Destroyers.

Audaz.....	400	30	6	2
Furor.....	380	28	6	..
Terror††.....	380	28	6	..
Osada.....	380	28	6	..
Pluton*.....	380	28	6	..
Proserpina.....	380	28	6	..

Torpedo-boats.

Ariete.....	26
Rayo.....	25½
Azor.....	24
Halcon.....	24
Habana.....	22
Barcelona.....	19½
Orion.....	21½
Refamosa.....	20½
Julia Ordenez....	20
Ejercito.....	25
Rigel.....	19
Pollux.....	19½
Castor.....	19
Aire.....	8

There are also four small vidette-boats, with speed of about 18½ knots, each carrying two light guns and two or three torpedo-tubes.

*Destroyed July 3, 1898, while attempting to escape from Santiago harbor.

†Disarmed by Spaniards, and sunk by American fleet off Santiago July 6, 1898.

††Disabled June 22, 1898, off San Juan, Porto Rico, by American cruiser "St. Paul."

AMERICAN AND SPANISH NAVIES COMPARED

AMERICAN WAR-SHIPS BUILDING.

We have five monster battleships in course of construction. The Kentucky and Kearsarge, launched at Newport News, March 24th, will be ready by November, 1898. They will be equally powerful with the Indiana. The Alabama was launched at Philadelphia, May 18, 1898, and the Illinois and Wisconsin (the latter building at San Francisco) will be launched early in 1899. These three are designed to surpass in size and power the Iowa, which is believed to be the equal of any European battleship afloat. Immediately after the breaking out of the Spanish-American war Congress authorized the construction of three additional battleships (making eight now under way), twelve torpedo-boats, sixteen torpedo-boat destroyers, four coast-defense monitors, and one gun-boat for service on the Lakes. These, of course, will be in addition to the vessels that were in course of construction prior to April, 1898.

SPANISH WAR-SHIPS BUILDING.

Spain is now building one battleship of about 10,000 tons; two armored cruisers, one of 10,500 tons, and the other, Pedro d'Aragon, of 6,840 tons; two protected cruisers, the Reina Regente and Rio de la Plata, of 5,372 and 1,775 tons respectively; one torpedo gunboat of 750 tons, and four large-size torpedo-boats. She can also command for arming as cruisers a dozen vessels of the Compania Transatlantica of Cadiz, varying in size from 3,084 to 6,932 tons, and in speed from 13½ to 17 knots. The transport Mindanao, destroyed at Manila, belonged to this line. So did the Alphonso XII, (the steamer, not the war-ship of that name), which, early in July, 1898, was beached near Mariel, twenty miles west of Havana, to escape capture, and was lost, cargo and all.

NAVIES OF SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES.

Defense has been the controlling idea on the part of Congress in making naval appropriations hitherto. Hence our thirteen great floating fortresses, or battleships (including the eight now building or authorized), immensely powerful, but of only moderate speed, as also our monitors, avowedly coast-defense vessels, and the best of them scarcely seaworthy. Of cruisers with large coaling capacity, adapted for long voyages and aggressive action in distant waters, we have regrettably few, though this deficiency is measurably supplied by the large and swift auxiliary cruisers into which the government has transformed the American transatlantic steamers and other liners.

Spain has but one really effective battleship in commission, the Pelayo, with another of the first class and one of the second class in an advanced stage of construction. We outclass her greatly in battleships. Spain's superiority in armored cruisers, as shown by the preceding list, was practically wiped out by the destruction of Cervera's

fleet, July 3, 1898. And her torpedo craft are no longer dreaded, being little better than mere shells, helpless in rough weather, or even dangerous for their crews, while their coaling capacity is very limited.

CALIBER AND GUNNERY.

In the caliber of guns our ships surpass those of Spain. The battleships *Indiana*, *Massachusetts* and *Oregon* carry four 13-inch guns each (besides other heavy guns), and the battleships *Kearsarge*, *Kentucky*, *Alabama*, *Illinois* and *Wisconsin*, now building, will each have the same. There is not a 13-inch gun in the Spanish navy, and only two 12½-inch ones (on the *Pelayo*) yet mounted, no 12-inch, and no more than eighteen 11-inch. The superior marksmanship of American gunners gives us another and tremendous advantage. Not only are our gunners thoroughly drilled in target-practice, but a prize of four dollars is offered for extra good hits, and to have this entered on the next monthly pay-roll is a coveted honor, aside from its money aspect.

ARMOR.

The maximum thickness of the steel armor carried on the side by United States war-vessels is eighteen inches, on the *Indiana*, *Massachusetts* and *Oregon*. The *Iowa* has fourteen and the *Texas* twelve inches. The *Kearsarge* and *Kentucky*, now completing, will carry fifteen inches, and the *Alabama*, *Illinois* and *Wisconsin*, sixteen and one half inches. The thickness of metal on the armored cruiser *Brooklyn* (Commodore Schley's flag-ship) is, in inches, as follows: Side, three; deck, three to six; turrets, five and one half; barbette (over which the great eight-inch guns are fired), eight. For the armored cruiser *New York* (Admiral Sampson's flag-ship), the figures are: Side, four inches; deck, three to six; turrets, five and one half; barbette, ten. The maximum thickness of armor for the Spanish navy is represented by the *Pelayo*'s, as follows: Armor belt, seventeen and three fourths inches; deck, four; barbette, nineteen and one fourth.

The "armor belt" of the *Pelayo* and the Spanish armored cruisers extends for several feet above the water-line, but between the armor belt and the barbette is an unprotected strip eight or ten feet wide running the length of the ship. On the other hand, the side armor of the United States vessels is continuous from water-line to battle-deck.

Of Spain's eight large armored cruisers, six have an armor belt twelve inches thick, which is reduced to ten and one half inches around the gun position, with a 2-inch or 3-inch protective steel deck. The *Emperador Carlos V.* (see list) has ten inches on her two gun-turrets, but her armor belt consists of only two inches of Harveyized steel. The *Cristobal Colon* had six inches of armor-plate and one and one half inches on her deck. Not much Harveyized steel has yet found place on Spanish war-ships, whereas its use by the United States has become extensive. Three inches of Harveyized steel has a resisting power equal to more than four inches of the best steel not thus treated,

THE GREAT GUNS OF MODERN WARFARE.

NAVAL GUNNERY ITEMS.

The 15-inch smooth bores used on the monitors represented the maximum efficiency of guns a generation ago. They would penetrate six inches of iron at the muzzle, and about three and one half inches at fifteen hundred yards. Great are the advances since the Civil War. The 13-inch rifled guns now in use on American battleships will penetrate twenty-seven inches of steel at the muzzle, or twenty-three inches at fifteen hundred yards. No armor placed on vessels can withstand the penetration of these guns at close range. The 67-ton guns of the British navy are no better.

To fire one of the 13-inch guns on the Indiana, which is the most formidable war-ship of the United States navy, costs, including the great tooled steel projectile of 1,100 pounds' weight, \$700 each time (\$150 for the powder charge and \$550 for the projectile), and it gives a pressure of two and one quarter tons to the square inch on the protected deck at each discharge. It is said the 12 and 13 inch guns can be fired only about one hundred times with either safety or accuracy; after that they must be discarded entirely, or used only with a low service of powder at closer range, or sometimes they may be rifled anew.

RANGE, RAPIDITY AND WEIGHT OF FIRE

A 12-inch gun, with a range of over ten miles, can deliver one shot in three minutes, but a few shots in quick succession will heat the gun so that it must be given time to cool off. A 5-inch gun, with a range of over four miles, can deliver five shots a minute, and a 4-inch gun, with a range of three and one half miles, eight shots a minute. Such rapidity, however, is practically impossible in actual engagements. "The battleship Texas," said the Secretary of the Navy, "is able to deliver a bow or stern fire of two 12-inch guns, and four 8-inch guns throwing 3,200 pounds of steel at every volley. In a single broadside volley there will be thrown over two and one half tons of metal." Yet the Texas figures in the United States naval list as a second-class battleship, and is quite surpassed, in respect to armament, by our first-class battleships. The shell carried by the 16-inch breech-loading rifled guns emplaced for the defense of New York weighs 2,370 pounds.

POWDER.

The use of modern rifled guns of large caliber, thirty to forty feet in length, giving high velocity and long range, was rendered possible by certain improvements in the manufacture of explosives for firing them. A great stride was made when large grains of the so-called prismatic powder began to be made. It is now usually in hexagonal form, the grains of such size that they will fit each other closely, and pack in the chamber of the gun with a minimum loss of space. The production of smokeless powder for large guns, though not yet entirely successful, will doubtless become so at no distant day.

TORPEDO-BOATS AND DESTROYERS.

TORPEDOES AND TORPEDO-TUBES.

The right which the United States recently purchased to use the Whitehead torpedo places our navy on a footing, in this regard, with the best of other nations. This weapon consists of a cylindrical steel vessel, with the forward end pointed and the rear end rigged up with fin-like rudders. It is eighteen inches in diameter, several feet long and weighs 835 pounds; and its forward compartment is loaded with 250 pounds of gun-cotton, one of the most tremendously powerful of all explosives. The torpedo-tube is practically a light sort of gun, of which the torpedo is the projectile. The latter is discharged from the tube either by compressed air or by a small powder charge. It is driven through the water by a propeller whose engines are set going in the act of discharge and are worked by compressed air. It may be impelled in any desired direction to a distance of not exceeding 800 yards, the ordinary range being about one third of a mile. The depth at which it runs is regulated by the horizontal rudders. Torpedoes are usually fired from above the water-level, but in some cases below it. When the torpedo strikes a solid substance, such as the hull of a ship, its charge of gun-cotton is immediately fired, with an effect inconceivably destructive. Four officers and sixteen men make up the regular crew of a torpedo-boat in the American navy, though the larger ones require rather more.

TORPEDO-BOAT ATTACK.

Precisely what amount of service torpedo-boats are capable of rendering is still to be determined, as their use in actual warfare is as yet almost untried. Theoretically the torpedo-boat's method of attack is to charge upon a ship at its full speed of twenty-five to thirty-eight miles an hour, and when within torpedo range to swing quickly around and let fly from the tubes amidship, or the stern, or from these in succession. If discovered, she will have been under fire of the enemy's rapid-fire guns since coming within a distance of three or four miles, and latterly under a hailstorm of missiles from his machine-gun or even of bullets from the rifles of his marines. It is hard to see how a torpedo-boat could accomplish its purpose when attacking in broad daylight. The deadly work of these little craft must be done on dark nights or in foggy weather, or else under cover of a smoke-cloud in heavy engagements.

Notwithstanding the torpedo-boat service is fraught with unusual danger, it has been eagerly sought by many of the younger officers of our navy. At any moment of an action the frail craft is liable to be destroyed by shot from the enemy's larger vessels, or perchance to be run down by one of his destroyers (see below). On the war-ships search-lights sweep the sea at night in every direction to guard against the approach of these dreaded intruders, the incessant watch for whom is weary, wearing work, all the more so because of its monotony. In

the darkness the moving torpedo is indicated to those launching it by lanterns, which are so shaped as to be visible only from the rear, and in the daytime by small flags.

DESTROYERS. To this single and vividly impressive name the cumbersome term torpedo-boat destroyers will doubtless soon be reduced in current literature. The destroyer is simply an enlarged torpedo-boat, provided with extra motive power for swiftness and extra heavy guns. It is thus equipped to catch the stealthy little assassin of the seas and send him to the bottom. In torpedo-boats and destroyers the United States navy has been very weak, judged by the standard of naval strategists abroad. The Porter and Dupont (see list on page 50), while carried on the naval list as torpedo-boats, could do fair service also as destroyers; but the Bailey, Stringham and Goldsborough, all now approaching completion, are our first vessels distinctively of this type. A large additional number of destroyers, besides many torpedo-boats, are now under way, and happily we have the facilities for turning them out rapidly. Our new destroyers will have a speed of from thirty to thirty-three knots an hour, and each will carry several six-pounders and two or more torpedo-tubes.

**SUBMARINE
TORPEDO-BOATS.** These constitute an entirely new essay in naval warfare, one which, if successful, will revolutionize it as completely as did Eriessons's monitor that superseded wooden ships with armored ones, and ushered in a new era in the use of war projectiles. The Plunger, now nearly completed at Baltimore, was built from designs by her inventor, Mr. John P. Holland. It has a length of eighty-five feet and a breadth of eleven and one half feet, with a displacement of one hundred and sixty-eight tons. Its speed of sixteen knots on the surface is reduced to ten when submerged. The little conning tower rising scarcely three feet above its top affords the ordinary opportunity for steering by observation. A small tube fitted at its top with an inclined mirror or prism can be raised above the conning tower, and when the boat is entirely submerged the navigator steers by the picture thrown down before him by the mirror. Of course, he has a compass, and the boat is also provided with an automatic gage to register the depth at which it is moving beneath the surface.

**THE HOLLAND
DIVING-BOAT.** In the winter of 1897-98 Mr. Holland finished a smaller boat of similar type, which was tested by the Navy Department in April, 1898, but not then purchased. This boat, commonly spoken of as the "Holland," is fifty-five feet long, ten and one fourth feet wide, and its displacement is fifty-five tons. It is built of steel, with the hull shaped like a cigar. Its motive power is of two kinds—gas-engines and storage batteries of great power. The latter (electric) motor is for use when the boat is under water. Compressed-air tanks supply the crew with fresh air, so that,

if need be, complete submersion could be protracted, according to its inventor's ideas, for several hours at a stretch. The so-called diving is effected by altering the pitch of the horizontal rudders as the vessel moves through the water, and in this the water-ballast tanks also assist. Reverse operations bring about the rising. For maintaining the little craft at her proper depth a delicate mechanism is employed similar to that used on the Whitehead torpedo. She has an under-water discharge tube at her bow for launching the deadly torpedo, also two other tubes. These latter two are inclined upward. The forward one, known as an aerial torpedo-gun, is capable of throwing a shell containing one hundred pounds of gun-cotton three fourths of a mile. Mr. Holland declared that with this gun he could destroy Morro Castle at Havana. From the third tube an under-water torpedo-gun, located astern, can throw a shell accurately two hundred yards under water.

COMMON NAVAL TERMS EXPLAINED.

Armament.—A collective term for all the guns (cannon) of a ship, their number and weight determining the strength of the armament. Guns of six-inch caliber or over are styled great guns, and for these the projectile and the explosives are made up separately. (See Rapid-fire guns, and Machine-guns.)

Armor.—The iron or steel sheathing given the sides and exposed deck of a war-vessel, for its protection.

Barbette.—Any good dictionary will give the meaning of this word as used in the science of military fortification. In sea warfare it means the steel wall, often from fifteen to nineteen inches thick, built up from below and inclosing the lower half or more of the revolving turret where the heaviest guns of a fighting ship are placed. Its main purpose is to protect the turning-gear of the turret, and, of course, it also furnishes a strong additional protection to the turret itself.

Battery.—A number of guns situated near, or at no great distance from, one another considered collectively. Also, the place where they are mounted.

Conning-tower.—The armored tower forward at the base of the steel military mast. Directly above it is the pilot-house, which, however, is deserted in an engagement for the safer steerage-room aft and far below. The conning-tower is then the commander's post, whence he directs everything. Telephones and speaking-tubes put him in direct communication with the gun-stations, engine-rooms, steering-room, etc.

Displacement.—The hull of a vessel riding the water displaces, of course, a certain quantity of it, which, estimated by tons' weight, is called the vessel's displacement.

Gatling Gun.—The successful pioneer among machine-guns, so called from its inventor, Dr. R. J. Gatling, of Indianapolis.

Knot.—A nautical mile which, by the United States official reckoning, consists of 6,080.27 feet, and by the English the same, minus the fraction. A statute mile is 5,280 feet; hence, a knot is nearly one sixth more, so that a vessel making twelve 'knots' speed, for example, is covering a distance equal on land to nearly fourteen miles.

Larboard.—The left-hand side as one stands looking toward the bow of the ship. Starboard is the right-hand side.

Machine-gun.—On war-vessels a gun firing shot and shell (not small-arms ammunition), and constructed to maintain a continuous fire by automatic mechanism.

Marines.—Troops enlisted for military service on shipboard, or at dock-yards, instead of in the army. The Marine Corps of the United States had a strength of 2,000 men before its recent increase.

Privateer.—In time of war a vessel armed and officered by private persons, but acting under a commission (letters of marque) from some established government. Privateering was once a favorite war measure, but, being so much like piracy, has now been renounced by almost every civilized nation, except Spain.

Rapid-fire Guns.—Ordnance, of less than six-inch caliber, for which the projectile and the explosive are put up as one whole.

Squadron.—A division of a fleet, or a detachment of ships employed on a particular service or station. In common language, a squadron is frequently spoken of as a fleet.

LOCATION OF UNITED STATES NAVY-YARDS.

The Brooklyn, Washington City and Pensacola navy-yards are located as indicated by their names. The League Island navy-yard is at Philadelphia; Charleston, at Boston; Gosport, near Norfolk, Va.; Kittery, opposite Portsmouth, N. H.; Mare Island, near San Francisco. The government dry-docks are at Brooklyn, N. Y., Port Royal, S. C., and San Francisco, Cal.

THE CUBAN (SPANISH) DEBT.

The so-called Cuban debt practically represents the amounts which Spain borrowed on the pledge of her Cuban revenues as security. Besides a floating debt (chiefly arrears due the army, navy contractors, etc., in Cuba), it consists of three series of bonds, issued in 1886, 1890 and 1896, respectively. These issues of stock aggregate \$435,200,210, while the floating debt at the outbreak of the Spanish-American war amounted to about \$70,000,000. The enormous total is more than \$500 per capita for Cuba's entire population.

KINDS OF WAR-SHIPS.

In the days of sailing vessels a "ship of the line" was a man-of-war sufficiently powerful to take its place in the line of battle. Its successor in our times is the **battleship**, heavily armored, and carrying the largest guns. The battleships of the United States Navy cost on an average \$3,000,000, exclusive of armament. Each is named after some one of the states of the Union. The Kearsarge is the only exception to this rule.

The **cruiser** comes next in fighting value, more especially because of its speed, which quite surpasses that of the battleship. Cruisers built for the navy are always named after American cities, instead of states.

An **armored cruiser** has both side and deck armor, which, however, is not nearly so thick as a battleship's.

A **protected cruiser** has deck armor only. An **unprotected cruiser**, though perhaps carrying powerful guns, is without armor, either on deck or side. Such are the great transatlantic or the Gulf "liners," lately chartered by the United States government for naval service.

A **gunboat** is a small, light-draft vessel of 800 to 2,000 tons, designed for gun-power rather than speed or coal-carrying capacity. In a loose way any small boat fitted up with one or more guns is often called a gunboat. A special class of rather small gunboats recently added to the United States navy are called composite gunboats.

A **monitor** is a light-draft, very low, heavily armored vessel of the peculiar type invented by Ericsson (who gave the name Monitor to the first specimen of it), and carrying on deck one or two revolving turrets that contain one or more great guns. Monitors combine, in remarkable degree, high gun-power and limited exposure, but at sea they are slow, clumsy and uncomfortable.

A **ram** is built, not for gun-power, but for strength combined with speed, its purpose being to crush in the side of an enemy's vessel. The United States ram Katahdin is the only vessel of its type in the world.

A **converted vessel** is one that has been altered from a revenue cutter, merchantman, tug, or the like, and armed.

First-class Vessels, Second-class, etc.—The rating of a ship must not be confounded with its class. In the United States Navy the rating is determined, not as formerly, by the number of guns carried, but wholly by size. A vessel of the first rate is one with a displacement of 5,000 tons or over; second rate is below 5,000 down to 3,000 tons; third rate, below 3,000 down to 1,000 tons; fourth rate, below 1,000 tons. In European official and American popular usage the terms first-class, second-class, etc., do not express fighting value absolutely, but merely the relative importance of different vessels of the same type—battleships compared with other battleships, cruisers with other cruisers, and so on. In close action a cruiser of the first class might be no match for a battleship of the second class.

NAVIES OF LEADING NATIONS AND SPAIN.

At the beginning of 1898 the navies of the leading nations and Spain (serviceable vessels) were constituted as below. Of "obsolete vessels" Spain had 59, nearly all wooden craft, and the United States 11. The fighting strength of the American navy was largely augmented during the first five months of 1898, while that of Spain was stationary, her additions no more than offsetting her losses in Manila bay, on May 1st, in the engagement with the American fleet under Commodore Dewey

CLASS OF VESSELS.	United States.	Spain.	Great Britain.	France.	Germany.	Italy.	Austria-Hungary.	Russia.
Battleships, 1st class.....	9	1	29	15	6	8	14
Guns of Same.....	433	35	1,371	672	200	353	456
Battleships, 2d and 3d classes.....	2	2	24	9	10	2	10	4
Guns of Same.....	45	51	829	292	255	139	284	120
Sea-going Coast Defense.....	6	6	12	8	7	3	7
Guns of Same.....	84	106	224	140	90	78	104
Non-sea-going Coast Defense.....	14	2	11	12	11	4	21
Guns of Same.....	30	9	129	104	33	16	239
Armored Cruisers.....	2	8	18	13	7	8	2	14
Guns of Same.....	74	208	863	337	270	343	110	424
Protected and Partially Protected Cruisers.....	16	12	123	47	13	23	8	3
Guns of Same.....	401	259	2,897	1,131	285	547	52	79
Unprotected Cruisers.....	5	4	3	14	6	2	20
Guns of Same.....	34	45	72	349	93	23	283
Gunboats, 1st class.....	18	11	42	16	2	12
Guns of Same.....	230	17	117	67	68
Gunboats, 2d and 3d class.....	13	20	33	1	2	8	2
Torpedo-boat Destroyers.....	3	17	103	17	18	18	11	39
Torpedo-boats, 1st class.....	18	11	51	46	104	117	36	88
" 2d ".....	1	28	32	149	51	4	5	6
" 3d ".....	2	9	107	54	16	70	35	97
Dispatch, Training, Transport, Repair, Tugs and Miscellaneous Vessels.....	68	25	219	105	47	55	21	98
Total Vessels.....	104	143	788	452	303	314	145	425
Total Guns.....	1,331	624	6,384	3,176	1,276	1,472	563	1,773
Officers.....	* 982	1,009	2,243	2,220	967	795	617	1,200
Seamen.....	* 12,600	16,300	58,916	49,300	17,820	20,406	11,900	36,000
Marines—Officers.....	400	746	1,640	226	83	76	382
" —Soldiers.....	6,920	17,842	27,800	2,500	440	720	2,890
Total Active List.....	13,582	24,629	79,947	80,920	21,513	21,724	13,313	40,532
Naval Reserves.....	2,800	25,000	83,000	84,350	37,000	19,600	2,000	45,000

* Includes marine corps.

Japan at the end of 1897 had in her navy 5 first-class and 2 smaller battleships, carrying in all 233 guns; 6 coast-defense vessels, with 34 guns; 4 armored and 22 unarmored cruisers; 9 gunboats; 147 torpedo-boats, nearly all second and third class; other vessels, 9.

RANK AND PAY IN THE ARMY AND NAVY.

EQUIVALENT RANK.

Following is the equivalent rank of commissioned officers in the two branches of service:

ARMY.	NAVY.	ARMY.	NAVY.
Second Lieutenant.....	Ensign	Colonel.....	Captain
First Lieutenant.....	Lieutenant (Junior)	Brigadier-General.....	Commodore
Captain.....	Lieutenant	Major-General.....	Rear-Admiral
Major.....	Lieutenant-Commander	Lieutenant-General.....	Vice-Admiral
Lieutenant-Colonel.....	Commander	General.....	Admiral

The grades of General and Lieutenant-General in the army, and Admiral and Vice-Admiral in the navy, have been abolished, but are subject to revival at the pleasure of Congress. Cadets, whether military or naval, are not commissioned officers, though drawing pay as named below.

PAY OF ARMY OFFICERS.

Army officers, in active service, receive yearly pay as follows:

GRADE.	First 5 Years' Service.	After 5 Years' Service.	After 10 Years' Service.	After 15 Years' Service.	After 20 Years' Service.
Major-General.....	\$7,500				
Brigadier-General.....	5,500				
Colonel.....	3,500	\$3,850	\$4,200	\$4,500	\$4,500
Lieutenant-Colonel.....	2,500	3,300	3,600	3,900	4,000
Major.....	2,000	2,750	3,000	3,250	3,500
Captain, mounted.....	2,000	2,200	2,400	2,600	2,800
Captain, not mounted.....	1,800	1,980	2,160	2,340	2,520
First Lieutenant, mounted.....	1,600	1,760	1,920	2,080	2,240
First Lieutenant, not mounted.....	1,500	1,650	1,800	1,950	2,100
Second Lieutenant, mounted.....	1,500	1,650	1,800	1,950	2,100
Second Lieutenant, not mounted.....	1,400	1,540	1,680	1,820	1,960

*The maximum pay of Colonels is limited to \$4,500, and of Lieutenant-Colonels to \$4,000.

Besides free instruction, cadets at the West Point Military Academy receive \$540 yearly pay. A Chaplain's pay is the same (including successive increases of 10, 20, 30 and 40 per cent for continued service) as given in the table for First Lieutenant, not mounted.

PAY OF NAVAL OFFICERS.

Naval officers on the active list receive yearly pay as follows:

RANK.	At Sea.	On Shore Duty.	On Leave or Waiting Orders.
Rear-Admirals.....	\$6,000	\$5,000	\$4,000
Commodores.....	5,000	4,000	3,000
Captains.....	4,500	3,500	2,800
Commanders.....	3,500	3,000	2,300
Lieutenant-Commanders*.....	2,800	2,400	2,000
Lieutenants*.....	2,400	2,000	1,600
Lieutenants (Junior Grade)*.....	1,800	1,500	1,200
Ensigns*.....	1,200	1,000	800
Chaplains†.....	2,500	2,000	1,600

*Pay increases \$200 per annum four years from date of commission.

†Pay increases \$300 per annum five years from date of commission.

Besides free instruction, cadets at the Annapolis Naval Academy receive \$500 yearly pay.

CAPE VERDE AND CANARY ISLANDS.

CAPE VERDE ISLANDS. A group of islands belonging to Portugal, in the Atlantic ocean, off the westernmost point of Africa. They lie in the same latitude as the Central American state of Honduras. Total area, about 1,680 square miles, with a population of 115,000, nine tenths being negroes and mulattoes. Porto Prayo is the capital. From St. Vincent, the principal harbor of the Cape Verde islands, to Porto Rico is 2,600 miles.

(“Dog islands,” from the Latin word *Canis*, a dog.)

CANARY ISLANDS. A group of islands off the west coast of Africa, in about the same latitude as Tampa, Florida. In round numbers they are seven hundred miles from Cadiz, Spain, and nine hundred miles from the Cape Verde islands. Total area, 2,808 square miles. Population (nearly all of Spanish or mixed origin), about 310,000. The capital is Santa Cruz de Santiago (“Holy Cross of St. Jago”), but is often spoken of as Teneriffe, being near the famous peak of that name. The former capital was Las Palmas. The Canaries are a valued possession of Spain.

LADRONE AND CAROLINE ISLANDS.

THE LADRONES. The Ladrone and Caroline groups, with the Marshall islands (German) and Gilbert islands (British), hundreds of miles eastward, constitute Micronesia, a name well and once happily known in missionary circles the world over. They are all coral islets, a thousand of them, rising only a few feet out of the sea and steeped in perpetual summer. The Ladrones reach up to the direct pathway of the steamer and at about five sevenths of the distance from Honolulu to Manila. The principal island, Guam, which lies a few hundred miles south of the direct route, was taken possession of June 21st by the first Philippine expedition, one company of the Fourteenth United States regulars replacing the Spanish garrison of fifty-four men, who, with the governor and other officers, were carried prisoners to Cavite. The score or two of Ladrone islands have a total area not much exceeding 400 square miles, with a population of about 10,000.

THE CAROLINES. These lie south of the Ladrones, and extend further east. Here came American missionaries in 1852, in the barkantine *Morning Star*, paid for with money raised by the children in Christian homes throughout the United States. Their work prospered greatly till, in an evil hour, in 1887, the Spaniards appeared with a claim of sovereignty, and began harrying the natives (who later turned upon and massacred their oppressors), and in violation of repeated pledges compelled the missionaries, by successive encroachments, to abandon their work. They eventually collected \$17,500 for the mission property destroyed, but were never able to return.

PORTO RICO.

LOCATION AND DIMENSIONS.

Porto (or Puerto) Rico is the fourth in size of the West Indian Islands, Hayti being the second and Jamaica the third. It was discovered by Columbus in 1493, on his second voyage, and in the early years of the following century was governed by Ponce de Leon, famous in American history from his fruitless search for the fountain of youth among the wilds of Florida. Spain held the island for upward of four centuries, though she had to fight for it more than once with the Dutch and the English. It is about 450 miles east of Cuba (in latitude a trifle further south), and is separated from it by Hayti and the adjoining straits. From Havana to San Juan, Porto Rico, the voyage is at least one thousand miles. The island's length is variously given by different authorities as from ninety to one hundred and eight miles. Its greatest breadth is thirty-seven miles, and its total area about 3,550 square miles. Between Porto Rico and Hayti flow the waters of the Mona Passage.

SURFACE, STREAMS AND FORESTS.

From east to west Porto Rico is traversed by a range of hills so situated that the streams flowing northward are much longer than those flowing south. The highest district is situated near the southeast corner where the peak of El Yunque attains an altitude of 3,600 feet. As the hills intercept the northwest trade-winds, with their rain-clouds, there is sometimes a superabundance of moisture in the northern lowlands, yet severe droughts in the south. The island is, upon the whole, exceptionally well watered, 1,300 streams being enumerated, of which forty-seven are large enough, from the European standard, to pass for rivers. Its general appearance is very beautiful. Forests in their tropical depth of green still cover all the higher portions of the hills. Roads and bridges, though somewhat improved of late years, are still the great want of the island.

PRODUCTS.

The two great staples of this fertile island are sugar and coffee, besides which tobacco, cotton, rice and Indian corn are extensively raised. Yams and plantains are also cultivated. Oranges, cocoanuts and other tropical fruits likewise receive attention and thrive luxuriantly. The principal food of the agricultural laboring class is a variety of mountain rice, grown without flooding. On the lowland pastures large herds of excellent cattle are reared to supply butcher-meat for St. Thomas (Danish) and the French islands of the Lesser Antilles. Porto Rico's exports (\$18,000,000 annually) exceed Jamaica's more than two to one, consisting mainly of sugar and molasses, coffee, honey, tobacco, beef and hides. A large part of the tobacco has always been sent to Havana, there to be manufactured, under the government monopoly, into cigars. Gold, iron, copper, coal and salt are all found in Porto Rico, but only the last is worked.

POPULATION. The population of some 800,000 is about three fifths white and two fifths black. Among the people of European origin are Spaniards, Germans, Swedes, Danes, Russians and Frenchmen, besides the descendants of Moorish Jews and natives of the Canary Islands. There are also a number of Chinese.

SAN JUAN, THE CAPITAL. San Juan de Puerto Rico (commonly abbreviated to San Juan), on the north coast, is the principal town, as well as the capital. It was founded by Ponce de Leon, in 1511, and is built on an island named Morro, connected with the mainland by bridges. The harbor is one of the best in the West Indies, having a comparatively unobstructed entrance, and even at the wharves a depth of ten to fifteen feet. The town of San Juan, with its district, has a population of about 30,000. It figures in history as a place of some military strength, and contains the palace of the governor-general in the old fort of Santa Catalina, bishop's palace, cathedral, government arsenal, town-house, theater, etc. It is regularly laid out, well drained, and one of the most healthful towns in the West Indies. The fortifications of San Juan were materially strengthened during the early months of 1898, and the harbor is said to have been mined.

OTHER TOWNS. Ponce, three miles inland from the south coast, is the next most important town, and in general appearance rather more modern, containing among other public buildings a town hall, hospital and Episcopal church, and it is lighted with gas by an English company. Mayaguez, on the west coast, is also situated several miles inland, and is separated from its port by a river, of late years bridged. The only other towns of any importance are Guayama on, and Coama near, the south coast, Aguadilla in the north-west corner of the island, and Arecibo on the north coast.

HARBORS, ROADS AND RAILROADS. Besides San Juan there are only two or three secure harbors in the whole island. The others are gradually filling up, and can be utilized by light-draft vessels only. This and the greatly inferior size of Porto Rico would make its blockade much easier of accomplishment than Cuba's. Since 1885 several miniature railroads have been built along the easier grades near the coast. The latest and best maps still show horse-trails to be almost the only means of communication throughout the greater part of the interior. Roads are still the great want.

SPANISH RULE. The aboriginal inhabitants were soon swept away by their Spanish conquerors, and almost no vestiges of them remain. In 1820 a movement looking toward independence was set on foot in Porto Rico, but by 1823 Spain had completely re-established her supremacy. Porto Rico has its own governor-general and a measure of autonomy, having been decreed in 1870 a province of Spain. For administrative purposes it is divided into seven departments. The last traces of slavery were abolished in 1873.

THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

[Other important information is given on page 40.]

GENERAL DESCRIPTION. The Philippine Islands were discovered by Magellan in 1521. Spanish conquest began in 1565, and in 1571 the capital was established at Manila. The Philippines constitute an important archipelago southeast of the continent of Asia, extending from $4^{\circ} 40'$ to 20° north latitude, and from $116^{\circ} 40'$ to $126^{\circ} 30'$ east longitude from Greenwich. The principal ones, from north to south, are Luzon, Camarines, Mindoro, Samar, Leyte, Penay, Negros, Cebu, Bohol, Mindanao, Palawan and the Sulu group of islands. The most northerly groups are the Batanes and Babuyan, between Luzon and Formosa. They are quite unimportant. All the islands may be characterized as mountainous and hilly, and much of the archipelago has undoubtedly been heaved from below the sea-level within comparatively recent times. It is believed to contain a considerable amount of undeveloped mineral wealth.

VOLCANOES AND EARTHQUAKES.

The working volcanoes are now comparatively few, but some of them have been very violent within quite recent times. In 1814 a terrible eruption of the Albay, or Mayon, volcano, in the southeastern part of Luzon, partially destroyed several large villages, and proved fatal to 12,000 persons, the matter thrown out forming vast deposits deep enough in some places near the mountain to bury the loftiest trees. A similar fate befell the same district during the eruption of 1867. On the thirty-first of October, 1876, one of the terrible storms for which the Philippines are notorious burst on this same mountain, pouring down whose sides and sweeping along the loose volcanic debris, the floods brought destruction on many settlements below, filling up the roads, breaking down the bridges and completely ruining upward of 6,000 houses. In the great wild island of Mindanao three volcanoes have been destructively active, at intervals, up to a late date. Earthquakes are so frequent and violent as to determine the styles adopted in the erection of the buildings. In 1874 they were felt daily for several weeks. But the most violent on record occurred in July, 1880, when the destruction of property was immense.

CLIMATE. The climate is genuinely tropical, with three seasons—the cold, hot and wet. The cold extends from November to February or March. The winds are then northerly, and, though there is no need for fire, woolen garments can be worn with comfort in the mornings; the sky is usually clear and the atmosphere bracing; and foreigners look forward to this period as the most enjoyable of the year. During the hot season, from March to June, the heat becomes very oppressive before the beginning of the southerly monsoon. Thunderstorms, often of terrific violence, are liable to occur in May and June.

The wet season covers July, August, September and October, when the rain comes down in torrents, and large tracts of the lower country are flooded. The northern islands lie in the region of the typhoons. At Manila the mean temperature for the cold season is about 72; hot season, 87, and wet season, 84½ degrees.

Rice is the staple food of the natives, who cultivate it extensively. But the plants of prime importance are Manila hemp, sugar-cane, tobacco, coffee and cocoa. Abaca, or Manila hemp, is grown in the southeast of Luzon and in Samar, Leyte and Bohol. Its cultivation requires little trouble, and the plantations, usually small, are each the property of a native family. Hand labor and a few simple machines of native construction are all that is required in the preparation of the fiber, from which are made ropes and cables of great durability, while its finer grades are woven into fabrics suitable for wearing-apparel, which is often beautiful and of high cost. Other qualities furnish the material for making the manila-paper so familiar to all.

The exports of sugar, as of other products, are mostly shipped from Manila, though nearly 2,000,000 pounds are exported from Iloilo (on the island of Panay), which is the port next in importance. Most of the larger plantations, some of them exceeding one thousand acres, are monastic property, and are leased out to Chinese half-breeds, who are said to succeed much better than Europeans. Coffee was introduced, probably from Brazil, in the latter part of the eighteenth century, but it was 1826 before the first plantation on a large scale was formed. Tobacco was made a government monopoly in 1781, and remained such till 1882. Though any one might grow the plant to any extent he pleased, the government was the only purchaser, fixed its own price, and, paying its debts according to its own convenience, was sometimes three or four years in arrears. Besides, certain districts were bound to furnish a certain quality of the leaf, and thus the peasant was forced, under severe penalties, to devote himself to the tobacco crop, when oftentimes he would have obtained better results from something else. Nearly 300,000,000 cigars have been manufactured annually, in six factories, employing twenty thousand hands, about one third for foreign export and the rest for home consumption.

IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN TRADE.

Under date of February 28, 1898, the United States consul at Manila, Mr. Oscar F. Williams, made an elaborate official report respecting the Philippines, in which he said: "Local authorities estimate the area of the Philippines at 150,000 square miles, and the population at 15,000,000. Twenty-two consulates are established at Manila. The volume of the export trade coming under my official supervision equals that of my twenty-one consular colleagues combined. The trade of the Philippines with the United States is growing at a remarkable rate. To-day I

have authenticated invoices for export amounting to \$138,006. During the last three months 216,000 bales of hemp were exported; of these 136,792 went to the United States, and 79,208 to Great Britain and other countries. Last year the increase of hemp shipments to the United States was 137,000 bales. Of the total increased shipments from the Philippines, those to the United States were fifty-four per cent greater than to all other countries together. In the item of sugar, which is the second in importance among the exports, the shipment to the United States was fifty-five per cent of the total to all points."

This is one of the great emporiums of the East.

CITY OF MANILA. The principal street of New Manila (that part north of Pasig river), is the Escolta, lined with innumerable shops and stalls, and crowded with a strange and motley population of various races. The Rosario is given over to the Chinese shops. In New Manila the streets are straight, but most of them unpaved, and during the rains almost impassable. The outlying districts of New Manila constitute the Binondo suburb, where many of the residences are airy cottages, reared amid groves of tropical trees, raised on posts to permit the free passage of the waters in the rainy season, and so constructed as, by their elasticity, to withstand earthquake shocks. Manila is a city of suburbs. Cavite, seven miles to the south, is very important as the location of the naval arsenal, etc. The northern suburbs are mostly given over to different lines of textile and other manufactures. Bulacan, five miles above Binondo, is a hive of fabricating industries. On the west shore of the bay, twenty-five miles across from Manila, is the fashionable resort of Balanga.

Manila has six daily newspapers, three banks, a mint, a chamber of commerce and complete electric-light and telegraph plants. The Mexican silver dollar is in general use. There are four regular steamship lines to Hong Kong and a monthly line to Liverpool. The leading railroad into the interior is first-class, having steel rails, stone culverts, and English engines capable of drawing trains forty-five miles an hour.

SPANISH ADMINISTRATION.

Under Spain the Philippines have been subject to a governor-general with supreme powers, assisted by a "junta of authorities," consisting of the archbishop, the commander of the forces, the admiral, the president of the supreme court, etc.; also by a central junta of agriculture, industry and commerce, and by a council of administration. In the provinces and districts the chief power was in the hands of alcaldes, and of governors combining both civil and military power. The Spanish method of raising revenues was simple enough. It consisted of naming some prominent and wealthy native the "cabeza de barangay" of a certain village or group of families, and making him responsible, sometimes to his complete beggary, for the collection of the tribute that had been assessed on his district. Chinese were subject to special taxes.

POPULATION. The great bulk of the population is made up of different tribes of Malays, some of them semi-civilized and nominally Christian (Roman Catholics), some pagan savages; while others, a little higher in civilization than the latter, are Mohammedans. The stronghold of these last is the island of Mindanao, though there are independent native tribes in the interior of nearly all the other larger islands as well. Of Europeans other than Spaniards, the number in the Philippines is few, divided between many nationalities. Many half-breeds, especially Chinese mestizos, are seen in Manila and elsewhere in Luzon. Chinese immigrants, in spite of massacres and administrative restrictions, form a powerful element in the Philippines. There is hardly a town or large village in which they are not found, petty trade and banking being nearly all in their hands.

HAWAII (OR SANDWICH) ISLANDS.

The Sandwich Islands were discovered in 1778 by Captain James Cook, who was afterward killed there by the cannibal natives. They were civilized and Christianized chiefly through the efforts of American missionaries, who began their work in 1820. The group comprises fifteen islands, the eight inhabited ones having a total area of 6,740 square miles (one sixth that of Ohio), as follows: Hawaii, 4,210; Maui, 760; Oahu, 600; Kauai, 590; Molokai, 270; Lanai, 150; Nihau, 97; Kahoolawe, 63. They are 2,100 miles from San Francisco, in a south-west direction, being about one third the total sailing distance from San Francisco to Manila. They owe their importance chiefly to their position, far out in the broad Pacific, in the line of commerce between the Pacific states and British Columbia on the one side, and Japan, China and Australasia on the other. The climate is healthful, with sea-breezes and moderate rains; mean temperature about seventy-five degrees, the thermometer having a range of only thirty degrees. The Hawaii Islands and Cuba are in precisely the same latitude.

POPULATION. The most striking feature under this head is the decrease of the natives from about 200,000 in 1878 to less than sixteen per cent of that number. A census taken early in 1897 gave a total population of 109,020, as follows: Hawaiians, 31,019; part Hawaiians, 8,485; Japanese, 24,407; Chinese, 21,616; Portuguese, 15,100; Americans, 3,086; British, 2,250; other nationalities, 3,057. The Americans thus number not quite three per cent of the whole, while the natives are quite exceeded by the combined count of the Japanese and Chinese, nearly all imported laborers on the sugar plantations.

PRODUCTS. Sugar is the great staple. Rice, coffee, hides, bananas and wool are also exported. Fine crops of wheat are raised in the uplands, and live stock of all the ordinary varieties thrive well. Among the minor crops in the valleys are cotton, tobacco, yams,

arrowroot and cacao. Ninety per cent of the commerce is with the United States. The latest annual report gives the value of sugar exports at \$7,976,000; rice, \$162,000; bananas, \$103,000.

HONOLULU.

This is the principal port, as well as the capital. It is situated on the island of Oahu, and had a population in 1897 of 28,061. Nearly all its trade is in the hands of Americans and Europeans. Honolulu has most of the local features of an enterprising American city, and is lighted by electricity. There are seventy-one miles of railroad in the islands, and two hundred and fifty miles of telegraph. A submarine telegraph between Honolulu and San Francisco is likely to be laid at no distant date.

HAWAIIAN REVOLUTION.

Each of the islands originally had its own chief, but shortly before the American missionaries went there the government was consolidated into one kingdom by Kamehameha I. Constitutions, increasingly liberal, were granted in 1840, 1852 and 1887. Queen Liliuokalani, who succeeded to the throne in 1891, desired more power for herself and the native population, and in January, 1893, attempted to force her cabinet to approve a new constitution drafted on those lines. In consequence she was deposed January 17th, by a Committee of Public Safety, and a provisional government was formed under the presidency of Sanford W. Dole (son of an American missionary), to continue until a treaty of annexation with the United States should be concluded. The treaty to this end which President Harrison sent to the United States Senate was withdrawn in March, 1893, by President Cleveland.

ANNEXATION ACCOMPLISHED.

On the fourth of July, 1894, a republic was proclaimed, with Mr. Dole as president for a six-years' term. The world soon grew accustomed to the idea of the absorption of Hawaii by the United States, and at length the advantages of utilizing the island as a naval base for our operations in the Philippines broke down the opposition of Congress. The fate of the annexation treaty in the Senate being still in doubt, Representative F. G. Newlands, of Nevada, proposed a joint resolution designed to accomplish the same end. It passed the House June 15, 1898, by a vote of 209 to 91; the Senate July 6th, by 42 to 21, and the next day was signed by the president. The resolution provided for a commission of five, two of them resident Hawaiians (the Americans appointed by the president being Senators Morgan and Cullom and Congressman Hitt), to recommend to Congress such legislation as they might deem advisable; assumed the public debt of Hawaii, not to exceed \$4,000,000; prohibited Chinese immigration; abrogated Hawaiian treaties with foreign powers; and, pending permanent legislation by Congress, placed the island under control of the president, who was likewise empowered to appoint persons to put into effect a provisional government.

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


Gunboat.

HELENA.

Speed, 13 knots.

Length, 250 $\frac{3}{4}$ feet; breadth, 40 feet. Displacement, 1,392 tons. Guns, eight 4-inch rapid-fire, four 6-pounder and four 1-pounder rapid-fire, and two Gatlings. One torpedo-tube. Armor, in inches, deck 5-16, slope $\frac{3}{8}$. Officers, 10; men, 160. Cost, \$280,000.



Dispatch-boat.

DOLPHIN.

Speed, 15 $\frac{1}{2}$ knots.

Length, 240 feet; breadth, 32 feet. Displacement, 1,486 tons. Guns, two 4-inch rapid-fire, two 6-pounder rapid-fire, two 47-millimeter Hotchkiss revolving cannon, and two Gatlings. Officers, 7; men, 108. Cost, \$315,000.



Training-ship.

BANCROFT.

Speed, $14\frac{1}{2}$ knots.

Length, $187\frac{1}{2}$ feet; breadth, 32 feet. Displacement, 839 tons. Guns, four 4-inch rapid-fire, two 6-pounder and two 3-pounder rapid-fire, one 1-pounder rapid-fire cannon, one 37-millimeter Hotchkiss revolving cannon, and one Gatling. Two torpedo-tubes. Armor, in inches, deck $\frac{1}{4}$, slope 5-16. Officers, 10; men, 113. Cost, \$250,000.



Gunboat.

YORKTOWN.

Speed, 16 knots.

Length, 230 feet; breadth, 36 feet. Displacement, 1,710 tons. Guns, six 6-inch breech-loading rifles, two 6-pounder, two 3-pounder and one 1-pounder rapid-fire, two 37-millimeter Hotchkiss revolving cannon, and two Gatlings. Six torpedo-tubes. Armor, in inches, deck and slope $\frac{3}{8}$. Officers, 14; men, 181. Cost, \$455,000.



Protected Steel Cruiser.

BOSTON.

Speed, $15\frac{1}{2}$ knots.

Length, $271\frac{1}{4}$ feet; breadth, 42 feet. Displacement, 3,000 tons. Guns, six 6-inch and two 8-inch breech-loading rifles, two 6-pounder, two 3-pounder and two 1-pounder rapid-fire, two 37 and two 47 millimeter Hotchkiss revolving cannon, and two Gatlings. Armor, in inches, deck and slope $1\frac{1}{2}$. Officers, 19; men, 265. Contract price, \$619,000.




Protected Steel Cruiser.

ATLANTA.


Speed, $15\frac{1}{2}$ knots.

Length, $271\frac{1}{4}$ feet; breadth, 42 feet. Displacement, 3,000 tons. Guns, six 6-inch and two 8-inch breech-loading rifles, two 6-pounder, two 3-pounder and four 1-pounder rapid-fire, two 47-millimeter Hotchkiss revolving cannon, and two Gatlings. Armor, in inches, deck and slope $1\frac{1}{2}$. Officers, 19; men, 265. Contract price, \$617,000.




Unprotected Steel Cruiser. **MARBLEHEAD.** Speed, $18\frac{1}{2}$ knots.

Length, 257 feet; breadth, 37 feet. Displacement, 2,089 tons. Guns, nine 5-inch rapid-fire, six 6-pounder and two 1-pounder rapid-fire, and two Gatlings. Three torpedo-tubes. Armor, in inches, deck 5-16, slope 7-16. Officers, 20; men, 254. Cost, \$674,000.



Unprotected Steel Cruiser. **MONTGOMERY.** Speed, $19\frac{1}{2}$ knots.

Length, 257 feet; breadth, 37 feet. Displacement, 2,089 tons. Guns, two 6-inch and eight 5-inch rapid-fire, six 6-pounder and two 1-pounder rapid-fire, and eleven Gatlings. Three torpedo-tubes. Armor, in inches, deck 5-16, slope 7-16. Officers, 13; men, 228. Cost, \$612,500.




Gunboat.

CONCORD.

Speed, 17 knots.

Length, 230 feet; breadth, 36 feet. Displacement, 1,710 tons. Guns, six 6-inch breech-loading rifles, two 6-pounder and two 3-pounder rapid-fire, two 37-millimeter Hotchkiss revolving cannon, and two Gatlings. Six torpedo-tubes. Armor, in inches, deck and slope $\frac{3}{8}$. Officers, 13; men, 180. Cost, \$490,000




Dynamite Cruiser.

VESUVIUS.

Speed, 21 $\frac{1}{2}$ knots.

Length, 252 $\frac{1}{2}$ feet; breadth, 26 $\frac{1}{2}$ feet. Displacement, 929 tons. Guns, three 15-inch dynamite, and three 3-pounder rapid-fire. Armor, in inches, deck and slope 3-16. Officers, 6; men, 64. Cost, \$350,000.




Protected Steel Cruiser.

SAN FRANCISCO.

Speed, $19\frac{1}{2}$ knots.

Length, 310 feet; breadth, 48 feet. Displacement, 4,098 tons. Guns, twelve 6-inch breech-loading rifles, four 6-pounder, four 3-pounder and two 1-pounder rapid-fire, three 37-millimeter Hotchkiss revolving cannon, and four Gatlings. Four torpedo-tubes. Armor, in inches, deck 2, slope 3. Officers, 33; men, 350. Cost, \$1,428,000.




Protected Steel Cruiser.

BALTIMORE.

Displacement, 4,413 tons.

Speed, 20 knots. Length, $327\frac{1}{2}$ feet; breadth, $48\frac{1}{2}$ feet. Guns, four 8-inch and six 6-inch breech-loading rifles, four 6-pounder, two 3-pounder and two 1-pounder rapid-fire, four 37-millimeter Hotchkiss revolving cannon, and two Gatlings. Four torpedo-tubes. Armor, in inches, deck $2\frac{1}{2}$, slope 4. Officers, 36; men, 350. Contract price, \$1,325,000.



Protected Steel Cruiser.

CINCINNATI.

Speed, 19 knots.

Length, 300 feet; breadth, 42 feet. Displacement, 3,213 tons. Guns, ten 5-inch and one 6-inch rapid-fire, eight 6-pounder and two 1-pounder rapid-fire, and two Gatlings. Two torpedo-tubes. Armor, in inches, deck 1, slope $2\frac{1}{2}$. Officers, 20; men, 293. Cost, \$1,100,000.




Protected Steel Cruiser.

MINNEAPOLIS.

Speed, $23\frac{1}{2}$ knots.

Length, 412 feet; breadth, 58 $\frac{1}{2}$ feet. Displacement, 7,375 tons. Guns, one 8-inch breech-loading rifle, two 6-inch and eight 4-inch rapid-fire, twelve 6-pounder and four 1-pounder rapid-fire, and four Gatlings. Five torpedo-tubes. Armor, in inches, deck $2\frac{1}{2}$, slope 4. Officers, 38; men, 456. Cost, \$2,690,000.




Unprotected Steel Cruiser.

DETROIT.

Speed, $18\frac{1}{2}$ knots.

Length, 257 feet; breadth, 37 feet. Displacement, 2,089 tons. Guns, nine 5-inch rapid-fire, six 6-pounder and two 1-pounder rapid-fire, and one Gatling. Three torpedo-tubes. Armor, in inches, deck 5-16, slope 7-16. Officers, 20; men 236. Cost, \$612,500.




Double-turret Monitor.

MONTEREY.

Speed, $13\frac{1}{2}$ knots.

Length, 256 feet; breadth, 59 feet. Displacement, 4,084 tons. Guns, two 12-inch and two 10-inch breech-loading rifles, six 6-pounder rapid-fire, two Gatlings, and four 1-pounder rapid-fire cannon. Armor, in inches, sides 13, turrets 8, barbettes 14, deck 3. Officers, 19; men, 172. Cost, \$1,628,950.



Steel Torpedo-boat.

CUSHING.

Speed, $22\frac{1}{2}$ knots.

Length, $138\frac{3}{4}$ feet; breadth, $14\frac{1}{4}$ feet. Displacement, 105 tons. Guns, three 1-pounder rapid-fire. Torpedo-tubes, three 18-inch Whitehead. Officers, 3; men, 20. Cost, \$82,750.



Gunboat.

BENNINGTON.

Speed, $17\frac{1}{2}$ knots.

Length, 230 feet; breadth, 36 feet. Displacement, 1,710 tons. Guns, six 6-inch breech-loading rifles, two 6-pounder and two 3-pounder rapid-fire, two 37-millimeter Hotchkiss revolving cannon, and two Gatlings. Six torpedo-tubes. Armor, in inches, deck and slope $\frac{3}{8}$. Officers, 16; men, 179. Cost, \$490,000.



Protected Steel Cruiser.

RALEIGH.

Speed, 19 knots.

Length, 300 feet; breadth, 42 feet. Displacement, 3,213 tons. Guns, one 6-inch and ten 5-inch rapid-fire, eight 6-pounder and four 1-pounder rapid-fire, and eleven Gatlings. Four torpedo-tubes. Armor, in inches, deck 1, slope $2\frac{1}{2}$. Officers, 20; men, 293. Cost, \$1,100,000.



Double-turret Monitor.


TERROR

Speed, 12 knots.

Length, 259½ feet; breadth, 55½ feet. Displacement, 3,990 tons. Guns, four 10-inch breech-loading rifles, and eight rapid-fire and machine-guns. Armor, in inches, sides 7, turrets 11½, deck 1½. Officers, 26; men, 151. Cost, \$3,178,046.



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